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Cloud Security Breaches

Cloud breaches involving Okta: 7 in the ledger

7 incidents in the ledger involve Okta. The most common access path among them is third-party access. The earliest was disclosed in 2022 and the latest in 2024. Each incident links to its company statement, filing, court document or post-mortem.

Open the ledger · All providers

DisclosedOrganizationAccess pathWhat was exposed
2024-02-01CloudflareLeaked access keys and secretsThe company stated the threat actor accessed some documentation and a limited amount of source code on its self-hosted Atlassian server, and that the only production systems reachable with the stolen credentials were its Atlassian environment.
2023-10-231PasswordThird-party accessThe post says no 1Password user data was accessed and no compromise of user data or other sensitive systems was found.
2023-10-20OktaStolen user credentials and session tokensOkta stated that files associated with 134 customers were accessed in its customer support system; some were HAR files containing session tokens, and the threat actor used them to hijack the sessions of 5 customers.
2023-10-20BeyondTrustThird-party accessThe post says there was no impact or exposure to BeyondTrust’s infrastructure or customers.
2023-08-29RetoolStolen user credentials and session tokensThe company stated that 27 cloud customer accounts were accessed without authorization (account takeovers, with emails changed and passwords reset); it stated no on-prem or managed accounts were affected.
2022-08-09CloudflareStolen user credentials and session tokensThe company stated that no Cloudflare systems were compromised.
2022-03-22Okta (contractor Sitel)Third-party accessThe post-mortem says screenshots were taken from a Sitel support engineer's computer; it states a maximum potential impact of 366 customers (approximately 2.5%) and that the Okta service was not breached.

How access was gained, entry by entry

  • Cloudflare: The company stated the actor used one access token and three service account credentials taken in the October 2023 Okta compromise that the company had failed to rotate.
  • 1Password: The company stated it detected suspicious activity on its Okta instance used to manage employee-facing apps on September 29, and later confirmed it was a result of the provider’s Support System breach.
  • Okta: Okta stated the access used a service account stored in the support system itself, whose username and password had been saved in an employee's personal Google account on an Okta-managed laptop.
  • BeyondTrust: The company stated it detected an attacker trying to access an in-house Okta administrator account using a valid session cookie stolen from the provider’s support system.
  • Retool: The company stated an employee was targeted by an SMS-based phishing attack followed by a call, and that the attacker added their own device to the employee's Okta account and used synced MFA codes to reach the VPN and internal admin systems.
  • Cloudflare: The company stated that employees received text messages pointing to a look-alike page for its identity provider, which asked for a username, password and a one-time code; individual employees did enter credentials, but physical security keys required for its applications stopped the attacker.
  • Okta (contractor Sitel): The post-mortem says an attacker obtained remote access, using RDP, to a computer owned and managed by Okta's sub-processor Sitel and used by a customer support engineer; the attacker did not take over an Okta account.

Sources

  1. Cloudflare, read 16 Nov 2026
  2. 1Password, read 16 Nov 2026
  3. Okta, read 16 Nov 2026
  4. BeyondTrust, read 16 Nov 2026
  5. Retool, read 16 Nov 2026
  6. Cloudflare, read 16 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.