Cloud breaches involving Okta: 7 in the ledger
Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
7 incidents in the ledger involve Okta. The most common access path among them is third-party access. The earliest was disclosed in 2022 and the latest in 2024. Each incident links to its company statement, filing, court document or post-mortem.
Open the ledger · All providers
| Disclosed | Organization | Access path | What was exposed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-02-01 | Cloudflare | Leaked access keys and secrets | The company stated the threat actor accessed some documentation and a limited amount of source code on its self-hosted Atlassian server, and that the only production systems reachable with the stolen credentials were its Atlassian environment. |
| 2023-10-23 | 1Password | Third-party access | The post says no 1Password user data was accessed and no compromise of user data or other sensitive systems was found. |
| 2023-10-20 | Okta | Stolen user credentials and session tokens | Okta stated that files associated with 134 customers were accessed in its customer support system; some were HAR files containing session tokens, and the threat actor used them to hijack the sessions of 5 customers. |
| 2023-10-20 | BeyondTrust | Third-party access | The post says there was no impact or exposure to BeyondTrust’s infrastructure or customers. |
| 2023-08-29 | Retool | Stolen user credentials and session tokens | The company stated that 27 cloud customer accounts were accessed without authorization (account takeovers, with emails changed and passwords reset); it stated no on-prem or managed accounts were affected. |
| 2022-08-09 | Cloudflare | Stolen user credentials and session tokens | The company stated that no Cloudflare systems were compromised. |
| 2022-03-22 | Okta (contractor Sitel) | Third-party access | The post-mortem says screenshots were taken from a Sitel support engineer's computer; it states a maximum potential impact of 366 customers (approximately 2.5%) and that the Okta service was not breached. |
How access was gained, entry by entry
- Cloudflare: The company stated the actor used one access token and three service account credentials taken in the October 2023 Okta compromise that the company had failed to rotate.
- 1Password: The company stated it detected suspicious activity on its Okta instance used to manage employee-facing apps on September 29, and later confirmed it was a result of the provider’s Support System breach.
- Okta: Okta stated the access used a service account stored in the support system itself, whose username and password had been saved in an employee's personal Google account on an Okta-managed laptop.
- BeyondTrust: The company stated it detected an attacker trying to access an in-house Okta administrator account using a valid session cookie stolen from the provider’s support system.
- Retool: The company stated an employee was targeted by an SMS-based phishing attack followed by a call, and that the attacker added their own device to the employee's Okta account and used synced MFA codes to reach the VPN and internal admin systems.
- Cloudflare: The company stated that employees received text messages pointing to a look-alike page for its identity provider, which asked for a username, password and a one-time code; individual employees did enter credentials, but physical security keys required for its applications stopped the attacker.
- Okta (contractor Sitel): The post-mortem says an attacker obtained remote access, using RDP, to a computer owned and managed by Okta's sub-processor Sitel and used by a customer support engineer; the attacker did not take over an Okta account.
Related pages
Sources
- Cloudflare, read 16 Nov 2026
- 1Password, read 16 Nov 2026
- Okta, read 16 Nov 2026
- BeyondTrust, read 16 Nov 2026
- Retool, read 16 Nov 2026
- Cloudflare, read 16 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.