Retool (2023): what the sources say about the cloud incident
Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
Retool disclosed the incident on 29 Aug 2023. What was exposed, as the sources state it: The company stated that 27 cloud customer accounts were accessed without authorization (account takeovers, with emails changed and passwords reset); it stated no on-prem or managed accounts were affected.
Open the ledger · Report a correction
- Disclosed
- 29 Aug 2023
- Incident window
- Attack on August 27, 2023; affected customers notified August 29, 2023, as the company states
- Cloud or provider
- Okta
- What was exposed
- The company stated that 27 cloud customer accounts were accessed without authorization (account takeovers, with emails changed and passwords reset); it stated no on-prem or managed accounts were affected.
- How access was gained
- The company stated an employee was targeted by an SMS-based phishing attack followed by a call, and that the attacker added their own device to the employee's Okta account and used synced MFA codes to reach the VPN and internal admin systems.
- Access path
- Stolen user credentials and session tokens
- Kind of control that addresses it
- Require phishing-resistant, device-bound authentication factors for all staff and keep one-time codes out of synchronised cloud accounts
In the words of the source
“The attacker was able to navigate through multiple layers of security controls after taking advantage of one of our employees through a SMS-based phishing attack.” (company statement, MFA isn't MFA)
Primary sources
- company statement: MFA isn't MFA, dated not stated
If a field is wrong or a newer primary source exists, write to the editor with the entry name in the subject.
Related pages
Sources
- MFA isn't MFA, read 16 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.