Okta (contractor Sitel) (2022): what the sources say about the cloud incident
Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
Okta (contractor Sitel) disclosed the incident on 22 Mar 2022. What was exposed, as the sources state it: The post-mortem says screenshots were taken from a Sitel support engineer's computer; it states a maximum potential impact of 366 customers (approximately 2.5%) and that the Okta service was not breached.
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- Disclosed
- 22 Mar 2022
- Incident window
- January 2022 (alert raised 2022-01-20)
- Cloud or provider
- Okta
- What was exposed
- The post-mortem says screenshots were taken from a Sitel support engineer's computer; it states a maximum potential impact of 366 customers (approximately 2.5%) and that the Okta service was not breached.
- How access was gained
- The post-mortem says an attacker obtained remote access, using RDP, to a computer owned and managed by Okta's sub-processor Sitel and used by a customer support engineer; the attacker did not take over an Okta account.
- Access path
- Third-party access
- Kind of control that addresses it
- require contractor-managed endpoints to meet the same hardening as employer-managed ones, and block remote-desktop access from the internet to devices that hold sessions to the identity provider
In the words of the source
“Our investigation determined that the screenshots, which were not contained in the Sitel summary report, were taken from a Sitel support engineer’s computer upon which an attacker had obtained remote access using RDP.” (provider post mortem, Okta's Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise)
Primary sources
- provider post mortem: Okta's Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise, dated 23 Mar 2022
If a field is wrong or a newer primary source exists, write to the editor with the entry name in the subject.
Related pages
Sources
- Okta's Investigation of the January 2022 Compromise, read 16 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.