Cloudflare (2024): what the sources say about the cloud incident
Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
Cloudflare disclosed the incident on 1 Feb 2024. What was exposed, as the sources state it: The company stated the threat actor accessed some documentation and a limited amount of source code on its self-hosted Atlassian server, and that the only production systems reachable with the stolen credentials were its Atlassian environment.
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- Disclosed
- 1 Feb 2024
- Incident window
- Reconnaissance from November 14, 2023; detected November 23, 2023; access terminated November 24, 2023, as the company states
- Cloud or provider
- Okta
- What was exposed
- The company stated the threat actor accessed some documentation and a limited amount of source code on its self-hosted Atlassian server, and that the only production systems reachable with the stolen credentials were its Atlassian environment.
- How access was gained
- The company stated the actor used one access token and three service account credentials taken in the October 2023 Okta compromise that the company had failed to rotate.
- Access path
- Leaked access keys and secrets; also Third-party access
- Kind of control that addresses it
- Rotate every credential exposed by an upstream provider incident, and inventory service tokens and service accounts so none are assumed unused
In the words of the source
“They did this by using one access token and three service account credentials that had been taken, and that we failed to rotate, after the Okta compromise of October 2023 .” (company statement, Thanksgiving 2023 security incident)
Primary sources
- company statement: Thanksgiving 2023 security incident, dated 1 Feb 2024
If a field is wrong or a newer primary source exists, write to the editor with the entry name in the subject.
Related pages
Sources
- Thanksgiving 2023 security incident, read 16 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.