# The Cloud Breach Ledger: public cloud incidents by access path, edition 16 Nov 2026

Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

The Cloud Breach Ledger lists public cloud incidents from 2019 to 16 November 2026. Each entry states what was exposed, how access was gained and which of eight access paths applies, using only company statements, regulator filings, court documents and provider post-mortems. A field without such a source reads not public.

The sourcing rule has no exceptions. An entry's facts come from a company statement (a press release, blog post, customer notice or SEC filing by the company), a regulator filing or decision, a court document, or a provider post-mortem. News articles, vendor research blogs and encyclopedias are not sources, though they may lead to one. Each entry quotes one verbatim sentence from its primary source, and an incident that cannot be sourced this way is left out.

Not public means that no primary source states the fact as of the read date, 16 November 2026. It does not mean the fact is unknown to the company or hidden from anyone. When a company or regulator publishes the fact later, the field changes and the change is logged on the corrections page. The ledger names organizations only, writes no motive or blame, and uses a group name only where the company's own statement uses it.

Counts are computed from the entries on the date of the edition. A count is the number of entries that match a filter, such as one access path, one provider or one year of publication. Counts measure sourced incidents, not all incidents, and a higher count for a provider does not say it is less safe. Entries are listed by date and never ranked. Third-party figures are kept apart, quoted with their publisher and year.

## Sources an entry may rest on

| Kind | Entries citing it |
| --- | --- |
| company statement | 39 |
| regulator filing | 60 |
| court document | 6 |
| provider post mortem | 14 |

## The eight access paths

| Path | Definition |
| --- | --- |
| [Leaked access keys and secrets](/access-paths/leaked-access-key/) | A leaked access key is a long-lived key, token or secret that ended up somewhere it should not be, such as a code repository, a container image, a log or a public file, and was then used by someone other than its owner to call a cloud provider's interfaces or reach a service. |
| [Stolen user credentials and session tokens](/access-paths/stolen-user-credentials/) | Stolen user credentials are the password or session token of a person, obtained by phishing, an infostealer, password spraying or a similar method, and then used to sign in as that person to a cloud console, a software-as-a-service tenant or a data platform, often where no second factor was required. |
| [Over-permissioned identities](/access-paths/over-permissioned-identity/) | An over-permissioned identity is a user, role, service account or application that held more access than its job needed, so that the extra access, and not the way the identity was compromised, set how much data or infrastructure an incident reached and how long the intruder could keep moving. |
| [Public storage, databases and services](/access-paths/public-resource/) | A public resource is a storage container, database or service that was left reachable to anyone who could find its address, with no sign-in required, because a setting, a policy or a firewall rule allowed anonymous access, whether by choice, by mistake or through a later change. |
| [Cross-tenant access](/access-paths/cross-tenant/) | Cross-tenant access is a flaw in a provider's service, or a setting in a customer's application or account, that let one customer's tenant reach resources belonging to another customer, so the boundary the provider draws around each customer did not hold for that request or token. |
| [Third-party access](/access-paths/third-party-access/) | Third-party access is access to a customer's cloud or software-as-a-service data that came through a vendor, supplier, integration or contractor the customer had trusted, so the incident began in the outside party's systems or credentials and reached the customer through a grant already in place. |
| [Exposed network services and request paths](/access-paths/exposed-network-service/) | An exposed network service is a reachable service or request path, such as an open management port, an unpatched internet-facing application or a request forged to reach a metadata endpoint, that gave a caller a way into a workload and into the credentials or data attached to it. |
| [Retained access after departure or change](/access-paths/retained-access/) | Retained access is access that a former employee, contractor or application kept after the reason for it ended, such as a password, key or connected app that nobody removed, and which was later used or left available to be used against the organization's cloud accounts. |

Cite this line: 'Cloud Security Breaches, the Cloud Breach Ledger, edition 16 Nov 2026, https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/methodology/'

## Related pages

- [Cloud security statistics: ledger counts and quoted figures](/statistics/)
- [Correct an entry in the Cloud Breach Ledger](/ledger-corrections/)
- [30 questions about public cloud incidents](/faq/)

## Sources

- AWS IAM User Guide: manage access keys for IAM users: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_access-keys.html (read 16 Nov 2026)
- AWS IAM User Guide: temporary security credentials: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp.html (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft Learn: shared access signatures overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Google Cloud: best practices for managing service account keys: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/best-practices-for-managing-service-account-keys (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft Learn: how multifactor authentication works: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-mfa-howitworks (read 16 Nov 2026)
- AWS IAM User Guide: multi-factor authentication in IAM: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa.html (read 16 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/methodology/
