MyRepublic Limited (2022): what the sources say about the cloud incident
Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
MyRepublic Limited disclosed the incident on 15 Sep 2022. What was exposed, as the sources state it: The PDPC decision states the personal data of 79,388 customers was accessed and exfiltrated: scanned copies of identity cards and work passes submitted as KYC documents and number portability documents.
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- Disclosed
- 15 Sep 2022
- Incident window
- 29 August 2021 (discovered)
- Cloud or provider
- AWS
- What was exposed
- The PDPC decision states the personal data of 79,388 customers was accessed and exfiltrated: scanned copies of identity cards and work passes submitted as KYC documents and number portability documents.
- How access was gained
- The decision says the Mobile Order Portal stored KYC documents in a bucket on AWS cloud storage, and the bucket's access key sat in the portal's source code. The external actor used the key to access the bucket. The company could not determine with certainty how the key was obtained but found it was disclosed in a portal page showing technical information and in a source repository open to all its developers.
- Access path
- Leaked access keys and secrets
- Kind of control that addresses it
- keep storage keys out of source code and technical debug pages, restrict repository access to those who need it, and use short-lived scoped credentials for storage access
In the words of the source
“Investigations revealed that the external actor had utilised the Access Key to access the Bucket.” (regulator filing, PDPC decision: MyRepublic Limited [2022] SGPDPC 5)
Primary sources
- regulator filing: PDPC decision: MyRepublic Limited [2022] SGPDPC 5, dated 15 Sep 2022
If a field is wrong or a newer primary source exists, write to the editor with the entry name in the subject.
Related pages
Sources
- PDPC decision: MyRepublic Limited [2022] SGPDPC 5, read 16 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.