# Microsoft (2023): what the sources say about the cloud incident

Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

Microsoft disclosed the incident on 18 Sep 2023. What was exposed, as the sources state it: Microsoft stated that data in an internal storage account included backups of two former employees' workstation profiles and internal Microsoft Teams messages of those employees; it stated no customer data was exposed.

- **Disclosed:** 18 Sep 2023
- **Incident window:** not public
- **Cloud or provider:** Microsoft Azure
- **What was exposed:** Microsoft stated that data in an internal storage account included backups of two former employees' workstation profiles and internal Microsoft Teams messages of those employees; it stated no customer data was exposed.
- **How access was gained:** Microsoft stated an employee shared a URL for a blob store in a public GitHub repository, and the URL included an overly-permissive Shared Access Signature token for an internal storage account.
- **Access path:** [Leaked access keys and secrets](/access-paths/leaked-access-key/); also [Over-permissioned identities](/access-paths/over-permissioned-identity/)
- **Kind of control that addresses it:** Issue storage access tokens with narrow scope and short expiry, and scan public code repositories for them before and after publication

## In the words of the source

“This URL included an overly-permissive Shared Access Signature (SAS) token for an internal storage account.” (provider post mortem, [Microsoft mitigated exposure of internal information in a storage account due to overly-permissive SAS token](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/09/microsoft-mitigated-exposure-of-internal-information-in-a-storage-account-due-to-overly-permissive-sas-token))

## Primary sources

- provider post mortem: [Microsoft mitigated exposure of internal information in a storage account due to overly-permissive SAS token](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/09/microsoft-mitigated-exposure-of-internal-information-in-a-storage-account-due-to-overly-permissive-sas-token), dated 18 Sep 2023

If a field is wrong or a newer primary source exists, [write to the editor](mailto:editor@cloudsecuritybreaches.com?subject=Correction%3A%20Microsoft%20(microsoft-ai-sas-token-2023)) with the entry name in the subject.

## Related pages

- [Sourcegraph 2023: leaked access keys and secrets](/incidents/sourcegraph-2023/)
- [Retool 2023: stolen user credentials and session tokens](/incidents/retool-2023/)
- [E-Commerce Enablers Pte. Ltd. 2023: ecommerce pdpc](/incidents/ecommerce-enablers-pdpc-2020/)

## Sources

- Microsoft mitigated exposure of internal information in a storage account due to overly-permissive SAS token: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/09/microsoft-mitigated-exposure-of-internal-information-in-a-storage-account-due-to-overly-permissive-sas-token (read 16 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/incidents/microsoft-ai-sas-token-2023/
