# MGM Resorts International (2022): what the sources say about the cloud incident

Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

MGM Resorts International disclosed the incident on 19 May 2022. What was exposed, as the sources state it: The OPC finding states MGM confirmed 1,934,090 Canadians were affected, including 5,635 whose government identifier (such as passport, Nexus, health card or military identification number) was compromised; the data set held names, dates of birth, phone numbers, emails and residence addresses.

- **Disclosed:** 19 May 2022
- **Incident window:** about 7 July 2019 (access); offered for sale from about 10 July 2019
- **Cloud or provider:** not public
- **What was exposed:** The OPC finding states MGM confirmed 1,934,090 Canadians were affected, including 5,635 whose government identifier (such as passport, Nexus, health card or military identification number) was compromised; the data set held names, dates of birth, phone numbers, emails and residence addresses.
- **How access was gained:** The OPC finding, relaying MGM's account, says an unauthorized actor logged into a third-party platform used by MGM software developers with an MGM employee's credentials compromised in an earlier unrelated breach, exploited a coding flaw on that platform to bypass multi-factor authentication, found a temporary access token, and used it to reach guest data on an external cloud server for about one hour.
- **Access path:** [Stolen user credentials and session tokens](/access-paths/stolen-user-credentials/); also [Third-party access](/access-paths/third-party-access/)
- **Kind of control that addresses it:** require phishing-resistant MFA that cannot be bypassed on any platform developers use, block reuse of breached passwords, and limit and expire access tokens for cloud data stores

## In the words of the source

“MGM explained that, based on its investigation of the breach, it determined that on approximately 7 July 2019, an unauthorized third party gained access to an external cloud server containing certain MGM guest data.” (regulator filing, [OPC PIPEDA Findings #2022-004: Investigation into MGM breach highlights how to assess risk, and need for timely assessment](https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2022/pipeda-2022-004/))

## Primary sources

- regulator filing: [OPC PIPEDA Findings #2022-004: Investigation into MGM breach highlights how to assess risk, and need for timely assessment](https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2022/pipeda-2022-004/), dated 19 May 2022

If a field is wrong or a newer primary source exists, [write to the editor](mailto:editor@cloudsecuritybreaches.com?subject=Correction%3A%20MGM%20Resorts%20International%20(mgm-resorts-opc-2019)) with the entry name in the subject.

## Related pages

- [GeniusU Pte. Ltd. 2022: pdpc](/incidents/geniusu-pdpc-2021/)
- [Heroku (Salesforce) and Travis CI OAuth tokens 2022: travi](/incidents/heroku-travisci-oauth-2022/)
- [Okta (contractor Sitel) 2022: third-party access](/incidents/okta-sitel-2022/)

## Sources

- OPC PIPEDA Findings #2022-004: Investigation into MGM breach highlights how to assess risk, and need for timely assessment: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2022/pipeda-2022-004/ (read 16 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/incidents/mgm-resorts-opc-2019/
