{
 "name": "The Cloud Breach Ledger",
 "edition": "2026-11-16",
 "read_date": "2026-11-16",
 "source": "https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/datasets/",
 "license": "CC BY 4.0",
 "cite": "Cite this line: 'Cloud Security Breaches, the Cloud Breach Ledger, edition 16 Nov 2026, https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/methodology/'",
 "description": "Public cloud incidents with disclosure date, cloud, what was exposed, how access was gained, the access path, the kind of control and the primary sources.",
 "rows": [
  {
   "slug": "veradigm-vendor-api-2026",
   "organization": "Veradigm Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2026-09-08",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says copies of certain personal data of patients were downloaded, including in some instances Social Security numbers; no clinical or medical data was involved and a small number of customers were affected.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says a third-party vendor had an incident and an unauthorized party obtained credentials from the vendor’s environment to a company application programming interface, then used them to download patient data; the compromised credentials gave access only through that interface.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "issue vendors narrowly scoped, short-lived API credentials, restrict them by network origin and alert on bulk downloads through vendor interfaces",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1124804/000119312526385249/mdrx-20260908.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "ieh-microsoft-365-2026",
   "organization": "IEH Corporation",
   "disclosed": "2026-08-06",
   "incident_window": "August 4, 2026",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "Mailbox contents of one employee, including email messages, attachments, customer communications, purchase orders and engineering-related documentation; the filing says no evidence currently exists that data was exfiltrated",
   "access_gained": "The filing says a phishing email carried a link disguised as a Microsoft document-sharing link, and the user entered Microsoft 365 credentials into a fraudulent login page.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for every Microsoft 365 account and block sign-in from unmanaged devices",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50292/000117494726000761/form8k-36187_iehc.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "amgen-cloud-environments-2026",
   "organization": "Amgen",
   "disclosed": "2026-07-31",
   "incident_window": "July 2026 (the filing)",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The company stated some of its data, including proprietary data, patient protected health information and other information, was exfiltrated from the cloud environments. Counts are not public.",
   "access_gained": "The Form 8-K says the company identified unauthorized activity involving data stored in cloud environments hosted by third-party cloud service providers. How access was gained is not public.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the filing does not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/318154/000031815426000119/amgn-20260729.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "adapthealth-cloud-apps-2026",
   "organization": "AdaptHealth Corp.",
   "disclosed": "2026-07-02",
   "incident_window": "data claim received June 15, 2026; materiality determined June 27, 2026",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says a stored password file associated with insurance billing was exfiltrated, plus passwords associated with insurance billing and certain personal and protected health information of patients; the full scope was not yet determined.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says a threat actor gained unauthorized access to certain cloud-based business applications (the provider is not named) after a social engineering attack that compromised a user session associated with a third-party contractor.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and short session lifetimes for contractor accounts, and revoke sessions on any report of social engineering",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1725255/000110465926080297/ahco-20260627x8k.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "adapthealth-contractor-session-2026",
   "organization": "AdaptHealth",
   "disclosed": "2026-07-02",
   "incident_window": "Statement of June 15, 2026 received from the actor; materiality determined June 27, 2026",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The company stated a stored password file associated with insurance billing was exfiltrated, external electronic health record portals were accessed, and affected data includes passwords associated with insurance billing and certain personal and protected health information of patients.",
   "access_gained": "The Form 8-K says a threat actor gained unauthorized access to certain cloud-based business applications, and that the incident was the result of a successful social engineering attack that compromised a user session associated with a third-party contractor.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant authentication and short-lived sessions for contractor accounts, and limit contractor access to the systems they need",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1725255/000110465926080297/ahco-20260627x8k.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "8x8-salesforce-klue-2026",
   "organization": "8x8, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2026-06-23",
   "incident_window": "June 11 to 12, 2026",
   "cloud": "Salesforce",
   "exposed": "Certain information from the company's Salesforce system: fragmented contract and opportunity information, sales team notes, and contact information of customers and prospective customers",
   "access_gained": "The filing says an unauthorized third party threat actor exploited the Klue third-party application programming integration connected to the company's Salesforce customer relationship management system.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "inventory and least-privilege every third-party integration connected to the CRM, and alert on integration activity outside its normal pattern",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1023731/000102373126000084/eght-20260617.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "irhythm-hosted-apps-2026",
   "organization": "iRhythm Holdings, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2026-06-15",
   "incident_window": "identified June 8, 2026, as the filing says",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says a threat actor claimed sensitive information including proprietary data, patient protected health information and other personal information, and the company confirmed certain data was exfiltrated; the volume is not public.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says the affected data was obtained through social engineering from certain third-party-hosted business applications (the provider is not named).",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for every account on hosted business applications and verify help-desk callers through a second channel",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1388658/000138865826000055/irtc-20260610.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "sailpoint-github-2026",
   "organization": "SailPoint, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2026-05-08",
   "incident_window": "detected April 20, 2026, as the filing says",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "A subset of the company’s GitHub repositories; the filing says no evidence that customer data in production or staging environments was accessed, and customers with information in the accessed repositories were notified.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says the company detected unauthorized access to a subset of its GitHub repositories and that the root cause was a vulnerability in a third-party application, which it does not name.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "review the scopes of every third-party application connected to source-control organizations, remove unused integrations, and patch or retire vulnerable ones",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2030781/000162828026033016/sail-20260508.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "maryland-medical-system-m365-2016",
   "organization": "A Maryland medical system (called Company A in the indictment release)",
   "disclosed": "2026-05-01",
   "incident_window": "July 2016 to September 2024, as the release says",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "The release says usernames, passwords, cookies, images, videos and other data of 195 victims, who were current or former employees or people affiliated with them, were obtained.",
   "access_gained": "The release says an employee used keylogging, cookie managers and mailbox rules to reach victims’ personal and professional accounts, including Microsoft 365, and exported browser cookies to keep unauthorized access from other devices.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "retained-access",
   "control_kind": "alert on mailbox rules that delete security notices, bind sessions to managed devices and monitor privileged staff with access to endpoint data",
   "sources": "court-document: https://web.archive.org/web/2026/https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/maryland-man-indicted-unauthorized-computer-access-related-maryland-medical-system-and"
  },
  {
   "slug": "adt-cloud-environments-2026",
   "organization": "ADT Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2026-04-24",
   "incident_window": "Became aware on April 20, 2026",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says only limited customer and prospective customer data was accessed. The cloud provider is not named.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says the company became aware of unauthorized access to certain cloud-based environments, terminated the access, and notified law enforcement. How access was gained is not public.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1703056/000170305626000038/adt-20260420.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "people-central-pdpc-2024",
   "organization": "People Central Pte. Ltd.",
   "disclosed": "2026-01-08",
   "incident_window": "29 April 2024 (extortion email); discovered by 3 May 2024",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states personal data of 95,000 employees of the company's clients was put at risk (including name, identity card number, salary, bank account number and address), plus 24,765 emergency contacts and children. The threat actor deleted databases and likely exfiltrated data, and data was found for sale on the dark web.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the company, a cloud-based HR software provider, had Remote Desktop Protocol access open to the internet without two-factor authentication on its AWS cloud servers, settings allowed inbound traffic from all IP addresses in the cloud environment, and SQL injection vulnerabilities were present with no web application firewall.",
   "access_path": "exposed-network-service",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "close management ports to the internet, restrict cloud network rules to known addresses, require MFA for remote access, and test web applications for injection",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/f9fdd00e-2e3d-4e69-a017-4da0db04d1ad"
  },
  {
   "slug": "mixpanel-smishing-2025",
   "organization": "Mixpanel",
   "disclosed": "2025-11-27",
   "incident_window": "from November 8, 2025",
   "cloud": "Mixpanel",
   "exposed": "not public",
   "access_gained": "The company stated it detected a smishing campaign on November 8, 2025, and took steps to contain unauthorized access and secure impacted user accounts; it revoked sessions and rotated compromised credentials for impacted accounts.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for staff accounts and revoke sessions on any report of credential phishing",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://mixpanel.com/blog/sms-security-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "illuminate-education-2021",
   "organization": "Illuminate Education, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2025-11-06",
   "incident_window": "Late December 2021 (the FTC press release); the New York Attorney General release dates the breach to 2022",
   "cloud": "not public (the FTC says a third-party cloud provider, not named in the press release)",
   "exposed": "The FTC states the hacker gained access to personal data of 10.1 million students, including email and mailing addresses, dates of birth, student records and health-related information. The New York Attorney General states the breach exposed personal information of millions of students, 1.7 million of them in New York.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC press release says that, according to the complaint, a hacker used the credentials of a former employee, who had left the company three and a half years earlier, to breach databases stored on a third-party cloud provider. It also says a third-party vendor had alerted the company in January 2020 to numerous security vulnerabilities and that student data was stored in plain text until at least January 2022.",
   "access_path": "retained-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "disable every account and credential of a departing employee at the moment of departure, and review active identities for dormant accounts on a schedule",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/12/ftc-takes-action-against-education-technology-provider-failing-secure-students-personal-data | regulator-filing: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2025/attorney-general-james-and-multistate-coalition-secure-51-million-education"
  },
  {
   "slug": "github-npm-shai-hulud-2025",
   "organization": "GitHub (npm registry)",
   "disclosed": "2025-09-22",
   "incident_window": "notified September 14, 2025, as the post says",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "The post says 500+ compromised packages were removed from the npm registry and that the worm could steal multiple types of secrets, not just npm tokens.",
   "access_gained": "GitHub stated that a self-replicating worm spread through compromised maintainer accounts by injecting malicious post-install scripts into popular packages.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and short-lived scoped tokens for package publishing and disable install scripts by default",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://github.blog/security/supply-chain-security/our-plan-for-a-more-secure-npm-supply-chain/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "cloudflare-salesforce-drift-2025",
   "organization": "Cloudflare",
   "disclosed": "2025-09-02",
   "incident_window": "August 9 to 17, 2025",
   "cloud": "Salesforce",
   "exposed": "Salesforce case objects (customer support tickets and associated data: contact information, subject lines and case correspondence, not attachments); the company found 104 Cloudflare API tokens in the data",
   "access_gained": "The company stated the threat actor obtained OAuth credentials associated with the Salesloft Drift chat agent's Salesforce integration, and used a stolen credential used by the Salesloft integration to log in to its Salesforce tenant.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "restrict third-party integration tokens to approved source addresses, give them minimum scopes, and rotate them on a short schedule",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://blog.cloudflare.com/response-to-salesloft-drift-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "nx-github-actions-2025",
   "organization": "Nx (Nrwl)",
   "disclosed": "2025-08-26",
   "incident_window": "August 26, 2025 (malicious packages live for 4 hours)",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "The company's npm publishing token; malicious package versions scanned users' systems and uploaded results to public GitHub repositories. The company stated Nx Cloud was not affected.",
   "access_gained": "The post-mortem says attackers exploited a GitHub Actions injection vulnerability to steal the npm publishing token; the repository's workflow permissions were read and write.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "set CI workflow tokens to read-only by default, avoid running untrusted pull request input with repository secrets, and publish with short-lived trusted-publisher credentials",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://nx.dev/blog/s1ngularity-postmortem"
  },
  {
   "slug": "salesloft-drift-2025",
   "organization": "Salesloft (Drift)",
   "disclosed": "2025-08-20",
   "incident_window": "March 22 to September 5, 2025",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "OAuth tokens for Drift customers' technology integrations, obtained from the Drift AWS environment; Salesloft GitHub repositories downloaded; environment variable secrets exfiltrated",
   "access_gained": "The investigation summary says the threat actor accessed the Salesloft GitHub account (March to June 2025), then accessed Drift's AWS environment and obtained OAuth tokens for customers' integrations, and used them to access data via Drift integrations.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "scope and monitor source-code hosting tokens, keep integration secrets out of repository and build environments, and restrict where integration tokens may be used from",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://trust.salesloft.com/?uid=Drift+Security+Update"
  },
  {
   "slug": "google-salesforce-instance-2025",
   "organization": "Google",
   "disclosed": "2025-08-05",
   "incident_window": "June 2025, as the update says",
   "cloud": "Salesforce",
   "exposed": "The update says a corporate Salesforce instance used to store contact information and related notes for small and medium businesses was affected; data retrieved was confined to basic and largely publicly available business information such as business names and contact details.",
   "access_gained": "Google stated that the instance was impacted by UNC6040 activity described in the same post, which describes voice phishing in which employees are tricked into authorizing a malicious connected app or sharing credentials.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "restrict who may authorize connected apps, require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and limit logins to known network ranges",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/voice-phishing-data-extortion"
  },
  {
   "slug": "aws-amazon-q-extension-2025",
   "organization": "Amazon Web Services",
   "disclosed": "2025-07-23",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "Malicious code was committed to the open-source repository of the Amazon Q Developer for VS Code extension and distributed in version 1.84.0; AWS stated it was unsuccessful in executing and made no changes to services or customer environments",
   "access_gained": "The bulletin says the extension had an inappropriately scoped GitHub token in its CodeBuild configuration, and with that token the threat actor committed malicious code.",
   "access_path": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "give build-system tokens the narrowest repository permissions and require review before any commit can enter a release",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/AWS-2025-015/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "zoomcar-cloud-2025",
   "organization": "Zoomcar Holdings, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2025-06-13",
   "incident_window": "Identified on June 9, 2025",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says an unauthorized third party accessed a limited dataset with personal information of a subset of approximately 8.4 million users (names, phone numbers, car registration numbers, personal addresses and email addresses). It says there was no evidence that financial information or plaintext passwords were compromised.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says the company identified unauthorized access to its information systems after employees received communications from a threat actor, and lists additional safeguards across the cloud and internal network as a response. How access was gained and which cloud provider was used are not public.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1854275/000121390025054319/ea0245724-8k_zoomcar.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "disney-slack-2024",
   "organization": "The Walt Disney Company",
   "disclosed": "2025-05-01",
   "incident_window": "April to May 2024, as the release says",
   "cloud": "Slack",
   "exposed": "The release says approximately 1.1 terabytes of confidential data from thousands of Slack channels was downloaded, then published in July 2024.",
   "access_gained": "The release says a malicious file posted online let an individual into an employee’s personal computer, where stored login credentials were obtained and used to reach the employee’s Slack account.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and device checks for chat and collaboration accounts and expire sessions on unmanaged devices",
   "sources": "court-document: https://web.archive.org/web/2026/https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/santa-clarita-man-agrees-plead-guilty-hacking-disney-employees-computer-downloading"
  },
  {
   "slug": "nova-scotia-power-opc-2025",
   "organization": "Nova Scotia Power",
   "disclosed": "2025-04-28",
   "incident_window": "19 March to 25 April 2025",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The OPC compliance letter states about 375,000 current and 540,000 former customers were affected: names, phone numbers, emails, mailing addresses, dates of birth, account histories (including billing and bank account numbers), driver's license numbers and social insurance numbers. It says data was exfiltrated from on-premises network files and cloud storage.",
   "access_gained": "The letter says an employee visited a compromised website and clicked a link, malware was installed, the threat actor moved across systems using accounts with domain administrator privileges, harvested credentials, took data between 23 and 25 April 2025, then used harvested credentials to destroy backups and deploy ransomware.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "limit and monitor domain administrator accounts, segment cloud storage from the on-premises network, keep protected backups, and delete personal data that is no longer needed",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2026/2026-ns-power-ca/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "advanced-computer-software-2022",
   "organization": "Advanced Computer Software Group Ltd (health and care subsidiary)",
   "disclosed": "2025-03-27",
   "incident_window": "August 2022",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The ICO states personal information belonging to 79,404 people was taken, including details of how to gain entry into the homes of 890 people receiving care at home.",
   "access_gained": "The ICO states hackers accessed certain systems of the company’s health and care subsidiary via a customer account that did not have multi-factor authentication (MFA). The ICO’s investigation found gaps in the deployment of MFA, a lack of comprehensive vulnerability scanning and inadequate patch management. The ICO does not state how the account was obtained.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require multi-factor authentication on every customer and administrator account that can reach a hosted service, with no exceptions, and verify coverage continuously",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/media-centre/news-and-blogs/2025/03/software-provider-fined-3m-following-2022-ransomware-attack/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "people-central-aws-rdp-2024",
   "organization": "People Central Pte. Ltd. (Singapore, cloud-based HR software provider)",
   "disclosed": "2025-03-20",
   "incident_window": "April 29, 2024 extortion email; regulator notified May 3, 2024",
   "cloud": "Amazon Web Services",
   "exposed": "The decision says a threat actor deleted databases and likely exfiltrated data from the company's AWS servers; data of 95,000 employees of its clients (including NRIC number, salary and bank account number) and of 24,765 emergency contacts and children was put at risk, and some data was found for sale on the dark web.",
   "access_gained": "The decision lists contributing lapses: SQL injection vulnerabilities in the web application with no web application firewall, RDP access open to the internet without two-factor authentication, settings that allowed inbound traffic from all IP addresses in the cloud environment, and vulnerability scanning only every two years.",
   "access_path": "exposed-network-service",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "do not expose remote-administration ports to the internet, require multi-factor authentication for any administrative access to cloud servers, and restrict security groups to known addresses",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/f9fdd00e-2e3d-4e69-a017-4da0db04d1ad?v=1"
  },
  {
   "slug": "salesforce-customers-vishing-2025",
   "organization": "Salesforce customers (multiple organizations)",
   "disclosed": "2025-03-12",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "Salesforce",
   "exposed": "Data exfiltrated from customer Salesforce accounts through a connected app; counts not public",
   "access_gained": "Salesforce stated threat actors impersonated IT support by phone, luring customers' employees and third-party support workers to phishing pages to steal credentials and MFA tokens, or to add a malicious connected app.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "restrict logins to known network ranges, require phishing-resistant MFA, and limit who may authorize connected apps",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://www.salesforce.com/blog/protect-against-social-engineering/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "powerschool-powersource-2024",
   "organization": "PowerSchool",
   "disclosed": "2025-01-07",
   "incident_window": "became aware December 28, 2024, as the page says",
   "cloud": "PowerSchool",
   "exposed": "The page says exfiltration of select PowerSchool SIS instances of Students and Teachers tables; counts not public in this source.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated, citing its forensic firm’s final report, that the threat actor accessed PowerSource, a community-focused customer support portal, using a single compromised credential.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication on every support and maintenance portal that can reach customer tenants, and limit what such portals can export",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.powerschool.com/security/sis-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "beyondtrust-remote-support-saas-2024",
   "organization": "BeyondTrust",
   "disclosed": "2024-12-08",
   "incident_window": "Identified December 5, 2024; investigation completed January 17, 2025",
   "cloud": "Amazon Web Services",
   "exposed": "The company stated a security incident involved 17 Remote Support SaaS customers: an infrastructure API key was used to enable access to certain Remote Support SaaS instances by resetting local application passwords. It stated no other BeyondTrust products or systems were affected and ransomware was not involved.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated a zero-day vulnerability of a third-party application was used to gain access to an online asset in a BeyondTrust AWS account, which allowed the threat actor to obtain an infrastructure API key that was then used against a separate AWS account that operated Remote Support infrastructure.",
   "access_path": "exposed-network-service",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "patch internet-facing third-party applications quickly, keep infrastructure API keys out of reach of application hosts, and scope keys so one account's key cannot act in a separate production account",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.beyondtrust.com/remote-support-saas-service-security-investigation"
  },
  {
   "slug": "avaya-cloud-file-sharing-2020",
   "organization": "Avaya Holdings Corp.",
   "disclosed": "2024-10-22",
   "incident_window": "The SEC says the company learned of the access in 2020",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The SEC order, as described in the SEC press release, finds the threat actor accessed at least 145 files in the company’s cloud file sharing environment, in addition to a limited number of company email messages.",
   "access_gained": "The SEC press release says the threat actor likely behind the SolarWinds Orion hack accessed the company’s systems without authorization. It describes the access as part of an investigation of public companies potentially impacted by the compromise of SolarWinds’ Orion software. The SEC charged the company over the accuracy of its public disclosure of the incident.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "treat vendor-supplied management software as a privileged path: restrict its network reach and credentials, and monitor the cloud file-sharing environment for bulk access by identities that do not normally read it",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-174"
  },
  {
   "slug": "verkada-2021",
   "organization": "Verkada Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2024-08-30",
   "incident_window": "Between December 2020 and March 2021 (at least two security breaches, per the FTC)",
   "cloud": "Verkada (cloud-based security camera provider)",
   "exposed": "The FTC states that in the March 2021 breach the hacker had access to over 150,000 live Verkada customer cameras and to customer information such as physical addresses, audio recordings and customer WiFi credentials. The Justice Department states security-camera footage of consumers at locations such as hospitals and schools was exposed to unauthorized access.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC press release says the complaint alleges the company failed to provide appropriate security measures, including failing to require unique and complex passwords, adequately encrypt customer data and implement secure network controls. The Justice Department release says the complaint alleges failures in appropriate access management and data protection controls. Neither source states how the hacker obtained the access.",
   "access_path": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "access_path_secondary": "exposed-network-service",
   "control_kind": "enforce unique, complex credentials and least-privilege access management on the administrative identities of a cloud service, and segment internal systems from its customer-facing platform",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://web.archive.org/web/2025/https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/08/ftc-takes-action-against-security-camera-firm-verkada-over-charges-it-failed-secure-videos-other | court-document: https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/295m-penalty-and-permanent-injunction-resolves-lawsuit-against-verkada-inc-alleged-unlawful"
  },
  {
   "slug": "att-third-party-cloud-2024",
   "organization": "AT&T",
   "disclosed": "2024-07-12",
   "incident_window": "April 14 to April 25, 2024, as the filing says",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says files containing AT&T records of customer call and text interactions from approximately May 1 to October 31, 2022, and January 2, 2023, were exfiltrated.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says threat actors unlawfully accessed an AT&T workspace on a third-party cloud platform; the filing does not say how access was gained.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732717/000073271724000046/t-20240506.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "advance-auto-parts-2024",
   "organization": "Advance Auto Parts",
   "disclosed": "2024-06-14",
   "incident_window": "Identified May 23, 2024, as the filing says; start not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says a criminal threat actor offered what it alleged to be Company data for sale on June 4, 2024; the filing does not state what data was exposed.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says the Company identified unauthorized activity within a third-party cloud database environment containing Company data; the filing does not say how access was gained.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1158449/000115844924000162/aap-20240523.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "pure-storage-snowflake-workspace-2024",
   "organization": "Pure Storage",
   "disclosed": "2024-06-13",
   "incident_window": "June 2024 (the filing)",
   "cloud": "Snowflake",
   "exposed": "The company stated the workspace did not include compromising information such as passwords for customer systems or any of the data stored on customer systems, but contained telemetry information used for proactive customer support.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says a third party temporarily gained unauthorized access to a single Snowflake data analytics workspace. How the access was gained is not public in the filing.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1474432/000162828024027955/pstg-20240505.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "live-nation-ticketmaster-2024",
   "organization": "Live Nation Entertainment",
   "disclosed": "2024-05-31",
   "incident_window": "Identified May 20, 2024, as the filing says; start not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says the affected third-party cloud database environment contained Company data, primarily from its Ticketmaster L.L.C. subsidiary, and that a criminal threat actor offered what it alleged to be Company user data for sale on May 27, 2024.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says the Company identified unauthorized activity within a third-party cloud database environment containing Company data; the filing does not say how access was gained.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1335258/000133525824000081/lyv-20240520.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "huggingface-spaces-secrets-2024",
   "organization": "Hugging Face",
   "disclosed": "2024-05-31",
   "incident_window": "Detected in the week of 2024-05-27 (the post: \"earlier this week\")",
   "cloud": "Hugging Face",
   "exposed": "The company stated it suspects a subset of Spaces secrets could have been accessed without authorization, and that it revoked a number of HF tokens present in those secrets. The number of secrets or users is not public.",
   "access_gained": "The post says the company detected unauthorized access to its Spaces platform, specifically related to Spaces secrets. How access was gained is not public. The company stated it removed organization tokens, added key management for Spaces secrets and expanded detection of leaked tokens.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://huggingface.co/blog/space-secrets-disclosure"
  },
  {
   "slug": "snowflake-customer-accounts-2024",
   "organization": "Snowflake customer accounts (multiple organizations)",
   "disclosed": "2024-05-30",
   "incident_window": "from May 2024; the 10-K says further attacks followed",
   "cloud": "Snowflake",
   "exposed": "not public",
   "access_gained": "Snowflake stated in its annual report that a threat actor accessed a number of customers’ Snowflake accounts because those customers had not met their obligations to implement multi-factor authentication and network access policies, and that it found no breach of its own platform or environment.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and network allow-lists for every identity with access to the data platform, and rotate static credentials",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1640147/000164014725000052/snow-20250131.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "dropbox-sign-2024",
   "organization": "Dropbox",
   "disclosed": "2024-05-01",
   "incident_window": "First access April 19, 2024; last observed activity April 20, 2024, as the company states",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The company stated the threat actor accessed Dropbox Sign customer information such as email addresses, user names, phone numbers and hashed passwords, general account settings, and authentication information such as API keys, OAuth tokens and multi-factor authentication; it stated no unauthorized access to document contents or payment information was found.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated a third party gained access to an automated system configuration tool, compromised a back-end service account with privileges across the production environment, and reached the customer database; it answered how access was gained with a compromised access token.",
   "access_path": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "Scope service accounts to the minimum production actions their automation needs, and protect and rotate the tokens that authenticate them",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://sign.dropbox.com/blog/a-recent-security-incident-involving-dropbox-sign | regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467623/000146762324000024/dbx-20240429.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "payroll2u-pdpc-2022",
   "organization": "Payroll2U Pte. Ltd.",
   "disclosed": "2024-04-22",
   "incident_window": "29 December 2022 to 16 January 2023",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states 81.95 GB of data was exfiltrated and posted on the dark web, including the personal data of 5,640 employees of a client: name, bank account number, salary, identity card number, address, date of birth and email.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says a single compromised user account was used for Remote Desktop Protocol access to five servers in the company's AWS environment, and that investigators could not determine how the credentials were obtained. It lists no MFA for administrator accounts or accounts with access to personal data.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "exposed-network-service",
   "control_kind": "require MFA for every account with access to cloud servers or personal data, limit remote desktop exposure, and detect unusual sign-ins",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/f3d9bace-cb3d-4e01-ab1c-5099c882744e"
  },
  {
   "slug": "cloudflare-thanksgiving-2023",
   "organization": "Cloudflare",
   "disclosed": "2024-02-01",
   "incident_window": "Reconnaissance from November 14, 2023; detected November 23, 2023; access terminated November 24, 2023, as the company states",
   "cloud": "Okta",
   "exposed": "The company stated the threat actor accessed some documentation and a limited amount of source code on its self-hosted Atlassian server, and that the only production systems reachable with the stolen credentials were its Atlassian environment.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated the actor used one access token and three service account credentials taken in the October 2023 Okta compromise that the company had failed to rotate.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "Rotate every credential exposed by an upstream provider incident, and inventory service tokens and service accounts so none are assumed unused",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://blog.cloudflare.com/thanksgiving-2023-security-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "hpe-midnight-blizzard-email-2024",
   "organization": "Hewlett Packard Enterprise",
   "disclosed": "2024-01-24",
   "incident_window": "Data accessed and exfiltrated from May 2023; the company was notified on December 12, 2023 (per the filing)",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The filing says the threat actor accessed and exfiltrated data from a small percentage of HPE mailboxes belonging to individuals in cybersecurity, go-to-market, business segments and other functions, and earlier a limited number of SharePoint files. The provider of the cloud-based email environment is not named in the filing.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says a suspected nation-state actor, which the company believes to be the threat actor Midnight Blizzard, gained unauthorized access to HPE's cloud-based email environment. How access was gained is not public.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1645590/000164559024000009/hpe-20240119.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "microsoft-midnight-blizzard-2024",
   "organization": "Microsoft",
   "disclosed": "2024-01-19",
   "incident_window": "Late November 2023 to January 12, 2024 (detection), as the company states",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "Microsoft stated that some emails and attached documents were exfiltrated from a very small percentage of corporate email accounts, including senior leadership and cybersecurity and legal staff; a March 2024 update says some source code repositories and internal systems were also accessed.",
   "access_gained": "Microsoft stated the threat actor used a password spray attack to compromise a legacy non-production test tenant account, then used that account's permissions to access corporate email accounts.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "Apply phishing-resistant MFA and lockout to every tenant account including legacy and test tenants, and scope application permissions so a test-tenant identity cannot reach production mailboxes",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2024/01/microsoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard | provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2024/03/update-on-microsoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard | regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/000119312524011295/d708866d8k.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "sf-bank-cloud-engineer-retained-laptop-2020",
   "organization": "A bank headquartered in San Francisco (not named in the U.S. Attorney release)",
   "disclosed": "2023-12-11",
   "incident_window": "Night of March 11, 2020 into the following morning (per the indictment as summarised in the release)",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The release says the bank's code repositories were deleted, a malicious script deleted logs, taunts were left in the code, sessions were opened in other employees' names, and proprietary bank code was emailed out. The release's subheading describes damage to the bank's cloud system. The cloud provider is not named.",
   "access_gained": "The release says a cloud engineer fired on March 11, 2020 used a company-issued laptop he had not returned to access the bank's computer network without authorization.",
   "access_path": "retained-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "revoke all cloud console, repository and VPN access and recover or remotely wipe company devices at the moment of termination, and alert on privileged activity by deprovisioned identities",
   "sources": "court-document: https://web.archive.org/web/2026/https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/disgruntled-cloud-engineer-sentenced-two-years-prison-intentionally-damaging-his"
  },
  {
   "slug": "global-tel-link-ftc-2020",
   "organization": "Global Tel*Link Corp.",
   "disclosed": "2023-11-16",
   "incident_window": "August 2020 to early September 2020 (the FTC press release says data was copied to the cloud in August 2020 and that the company was notified of data on the dark web in early September)",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The FTC states the personal information of nearly 650,000 real users, including full names, dates of birth, phone numbers and usernames, was copied unencrypted into a cloud test environment. The FTC says a forensic analysis showed that a handful of hackers accessed billions of bytes of the exposed data.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC press release says that, after the company and a third-party vendor copied the data into the cloud for testing, changes made by the vendor to the security settings left the data accessible via the internet without safeguards, until a security researcher alerted the company.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "require review and approval of any security-setting change on cloud environments that hold personal data, keep real personal data out of test environments, and alert on settings that expose a data store to the internet",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/11/ftc-takes-action-against-global-tellink-corp-failing-adequately-secure-data-notify-consumers-after"
  },
  {
   "slug": "sumo-logic-aws-credential-2023",
   "organization": "Sumo Logic",
   "disclosed": "2023-11-07",
   "incident_window": "Discovered November 3, 2023",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The company stated that, after investigation by its teams and third-party forensic experts, it found no proof of customer data impact. It advised customers to rotate API access keys and stored third-party credentials.",
   "access_gained": "The customer notice says the activity used a compromised credential to access a Sumo Logic AWS account. How the credential was compromised is not public.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "replace long-lived credentials for cloud accounts with short-lived role credentials and alert on their use from new locations",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://web.archive.org/web/20240101000000/https://www.sumologic.com/security-response-center/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "1password-okta-2023",
   "organization": "1Password",
   "disclosed": "2023-10-23",
   "incident_window": "September 29 to October 2023, as the post says",
   "cloud": "Okta",
   "exposed": "The post says no 1Password user data was accessed and no compromise of user data or other sensitive systems was found.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated it detected suspicious activity on its Okta instance used to manage employee-facing apps on September 29, and later confirmed it was a result of the provider’s Support System breach.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "treat identity-provider support exchanges as sensitive, strip session material from files sent to a provider, and alert on administrator sessions that originate outside known networks",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://blog.1password.com/okta-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "okta-support-system-2023",
   "organization": "Okta",
   "disclosed": "2023-10-20",
   "incident_window": "September 28, 2023 to October 17, 2023, as the company states",
   "cloud": "Okta",
   "exposed": "Okta stated that files associated with 134 customers were accessed in its customer support system; some were HAR files containing session tokens, and the threat actor used them to hijack the sessions of 5 customers.",
   "access_gained": "Okta stated the access used a service account stored in the support system itself, whose username and password had been saved in an employee's personal Google account on an Okta-managed laptop.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "Block sign-in to personal profiles on managed browsers, bind admin session tokens to network location, and require customers' support uploads to be sanitised of session tokens",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/11/unauthorized-access-oktas-support-case-management-system-root-cause/ | company-statement: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/10/tracking-unauthorized-access-oktas-support-system/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "beyondtrust-okta-2023",
   "organization": "BeyondTrust",
   "disclosed": "2023-10-20",
   "incident_window": "October 2, 2023, as the post says",
   "cloud": "Okta",
   "exposed": "The post says there was no impact or exposure to BeyondTrust’s infrastructure or customers.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated it detected an attacker trying to access an in-house Okta administrator account using a valid session cookie stolen from the provider’s support system.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "bind administrator sessions to the device and network they started on, restrict identity-provider admin access to managed networks, and alert on session reuse from new locations",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/okta-support-unit-breach"
  },
  {
   "slug": "23andme-2023",
   "organization": "23andMe",
   "disclosed": "2023-10-06",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The company stated the threat actor accessed roughly 14,000 user accounts (less than 0.1% of 14 million customers) and, through them, information in approximately 5.5 million DNA Relatives profiles and approximately 1.4 million Family Tree profiles.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated the threat actor accessed accounts through credential stuffing, using usernames and passwords that were also used on other websites previously compromised.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "Require a second authentication factor for every consumer account and screen new passwords against known-compromised credential lists",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://blog.23andme.com/articles/addressing-data-security-concerns"
  },
  {
   "slug": "microsoft-ai-sas-token-2023",
   "organization": "Microsoft",
   "disclosed": "2023-09-18",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "Microsoft Azure",
   "exposed": "Microsoft stated that data in an internal storage account included backups of two former employees' workstation profiles and internal Microsoft Teams messages of those employees; it stated no customer data was exposed.",
   "access_gained": "Microsoft stated an employee shared a URL for a blob store in a public GitHub repository, and the URL included an overly-permissive Shared Access Signature token for an internal storage account.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "Issue storage access tokens with narrow scope and short expiry, and scan public code repositories for them before and after publication",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/09/microsoft-mitigated-exposure-of-internal-information-in-a-storage-account-due-to-overly-permissive-sas-token"
  },
  {
   "slug": "sourcegraph-2023",
   "organization": "Sourcegraph",
   "disclosed": "2023-08-30",
   "incident_window": "Token committed July 14, 2023; unauthorized admin access August 30, 2023, as the company states",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The company stated that paid customers' license key recipient names and email addresses, a small subset of license keys, and community users' account email addresses may have been accessed; it stated no private code or other customer data was accessible.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated a malicious actor used a leaked site-admin access token, accidentally committed in a pull request, to raise an account to site-admin on Sourcegraph.com.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "Run secret scanning on every commit with push-time blocking, and issue admin tokens with short expiry and narrow scope",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://sourcegraph.com/blog/security-update-august-2023"
  },
  {
   "slug": "retool-2023",
   "organization": "Retool",
   "disclosed": "2023-08-29",
   "incident_window": "Attack on August 27, 2023; affected customers notified August 29, 2023, as the company states",
   "cloud": "Okta",
   "exposed": "The company stated that 27 cloud customer accounts were accessed without authorization (account takeovers, with emails changed and passwords reset); it stated no on-prem or managed accounts were affected.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated an employee was targeted by an SMS-based phishing attack followed by a call, and that the attacker added their own device to the employee's Okta account and used synced MFA codes to reach the VPN and internal admin systems.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "Require phishing-resistant, device-bound authentication factors for all staff and keep one-time codes out of synchronised cloud accounts",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://retool.com/blog/mfa-isnt-mfa"
  },
  {
   "slug": "ecommerce-enablers-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "E-Commerce Enablers Pte. Ltd.",
   "disclosed": "2023-08-16",
   "incident_window": "4 June 2019 (key committed) to 9 September 2020 (key used); discovered 17 September 2020",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states customer data on virtual servers in an AWS environment was exfiltrated, with counts including 1,457,637 email addresses, 840,210 names, 447,076 mobile numbers, 299,381 bank account numbers and 378,531 partial credit card records.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says an AWS access key with full administrative privileges was committed to a private GitHub repository on 4 June 2019, removed on 6 June but still viewable in the commit history, and not fully disabled when a replacement key was created. On 9 September 2020 a threat actor used it to reach the AWS environment, changed security settings to allow remote internet access to database instances and exfiltrated data. The company conjectured the key was found in the commit history.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "never commit cloud keys to code repositories, scan repository history for secrets, fully revoke replaced keys, and avoid full-administrator keys for routine deployment work",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/777b18ae-71e5-4e5d-9e89-9d1b54aca926"
  },
  {
   "slug": "jumpcloud-orchestration-2023",
   "organization": "JumpCloud",
   "disclosed": "2023-07-12",
   "incident_window": "June 22 to July 2023 (the company: spear-phishing on June 22, anomalous activity found June 27, customer impact found July 5)",
   "cloud": "JumpCloud",
   "exposed": "The company stated fewer than 5 customers and fewer than 10 devices were impacted, out of more than 200,000 organizations on the platform, and that all impacted customers were notified directly.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated it traced anomalous activity on an internal orchestration system to a spear-phishing campaign on June 22, which gave unauthorized access to a specific area of its infrastructure. It later found unusual activity in the commands framework for a small set of customers, and stated the attack vector was data injection into its commands framework.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "cross-tenant",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant authentication for staff with access to orchestration systems, and isolate customer command execution from internal tooling",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://jumpcloud.com/blog/security-update-incident-details"
  },
  {
   "slug": "microsoft-storm-0558-2023",
   "organization": "Microsoft",
   "disclosed": "2023-07-11",
   "incident_window": "From May 15, 2023, as the company states",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "Microsoft stated that email accounts affecting approximately 25 organizations in the public cloud, including government agencies, and related consumer accounts were accessed.",
   "access_gained": "Microsoft stated the actor used an acquired Microsoft account consumer signing key to forge tokens, and exploited a token validation issue so that enterprise mail accepted them. The post-mortem says the most probable mechanism for the key acquisition was a compromised engineer corporate account with access to a debugging environment holding a crash dump that contained the key.",
   "access_path": "cross-tenant",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "Validate token issuer and key scope in every service that accepts signed tokens, and keep signing key material inside isolated key-management systems with credential scanning of debug artefacts",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/07/microsoft-mitigates-china-based-threat-actor-storm-0558-targeting-of-customer-email | provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/09/results-of-major-technical-investigations-for-storm-0558-key-acquisition"
  },
  {
   "slug": "vitagene-1health-ftc-2019",
   "organization": "1Health.io Inc. (formerly Vitagene, Inc.)",
   "disclosed": "2023-06-16",
   "incident_window": "2019 (a security researcher contacted the company in June 2019; the FTC says the company was warned at least three times over a two-year period)",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The FTC states nearly 2,400 health reports about consumers and raw genetic data of at least 227 consumers, sometimes accompanied by a first name, sat in publicly accessible buckets, unencrypted, according to the complaint.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC press release says the company stored the data in publicly accessible buckets on AWS cloud storage, did not encrypt it, restrict access to it, log or monitor access to it, or inventory it, and that it was warned at least three times over a two-year period before investigating after a security researcher contacted it in June 2019.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "inventory cloud storage, deny public access to buckets by default, and alert on any bucket or object that becomes publicly readable",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/06/ftc-says-genetic-testing-company-1health-failed-protect-privacy-security-dna-data-unfairly-changed"
  },
  {
   "slug": "github-rsa-ssh-key-2023",
   "organization": "GitHub",
   "disclosed": "2023-03-23",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "The company stated GitHub.com's RSA SSH private key was briefly exposed in a public GitHub repository; it stated it had no reason to believe the key was abused and that no GitHub systems or customer information were compromised.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated the exposure resulted from what it believes was an inadvertent publishing of private information.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "Run secret scanning on all repositories including private-to-public transitions, and keep host private keys in managed key storage",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://github.blog/2023-03-23-we-updated-our-rsa-ssh-host-key/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "eatigo-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "Eatigo International Pte. Ltd.",
   "disclosed": "2023-03-10",
   "incident_window": "between 2018 and 2020 (exact date not determined)",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states a legacy database of approximately 2.76 million users, last updated in late 2018, was accessed and was offered for sale on an online forum.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the legacy database sat on the infrastructure of a cloud service provider in Singapore, was left out of the company's private network setup, was reachable from the internet to anyone with the credentials, and had no password rotation rule. Staff no longer knew it existed, and no asset inventory or access logs were kept, so the company could not establish how or when access was gained.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "keep an inventory of every cloud database, retire legacy databases, keep databases off the internet, and rotate and monitor database credentials",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/67f7dfe6-0971-4086-ba23-6239c5fceb26"
  },
  {
   "slug": "mailchimp-2023",
   "organization": "Mailchimp (Intuit)",
   "disclosed": "2023-01-13",
   "incident_window": "Identified January 11, 2023; start not public",
   "cloud": "Mailchimp",
   "exposed": "The company stated the incident was limited to 133 Mailchimp accounts and that it found no evidence Intuit systems or customer data beyond those accounts were affected.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated an unauthorized actor used a social engineering attack on employees and contractors and used the compromised employee credentials to reach an internal customer support and account administration tool.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "Require phishing-resistant MFA for staff and contractors with access to customer-account administration tools and alert on bulk account access",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://mailchimp.com/january-2023-security-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "circleci-2023",
   "organization": "CircleCI",
   "disclosed": "2023-01-04",
   "incident_window": "Machine compromised December 16, 2022; exfiltration December 22, 2022, as the company states",
   "cloud": "CircleCI",
   "exposed": "The company stated that data from a subset of databases and stores was exfiltrated, including customer environment variables, tokens and keys; the data was encrypted at rest and the third party extracted encryption keys from a running process.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that malware on an engineer's laptop stole a valid 2FA-backed SSO session, and that the employee held privileges to generate production access tokens.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "Bind sessions to the device and require step-up, phishing-resistant authentication before any identity can generate production access tokens",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "slack-github-tokens-2022",
   "organization": "Slack",
   "disclosed": "2022-12-31",
   "incident_window": "December 2022 (repositories downloaded 2022-12-27)",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "The company stated that private code repositories were downloaded, that they contained no customer data, means to access customer data or Slack's primary codebase, and that the production environment was not accessed.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that a limited number of employee tokens were stolen and misused to reach its externally hosted GitHub repository, and that a third-party vendor was compromised.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "store source-control tokens in a managed secret store with short lifetimes and IP allow-listing, and alert on token use from unexpected locations",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://slack.com/blog/news/slack-security-update"
  },
  {
   "slug": "lastpass-cloud-storage-2022",
   "organization": "LastPass",
   "disclosed": "2022-12-22",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The company stated that a backup copy of customer account information and a backup of customer vault data (with some fields unencrypted, such as website URLs, and others encrypted) were copied from a cloud-based storage service.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that an unknown threat actor accessed a cloud-based storage environment using information obtained from the August 2022 incident, and that credentials and keys obtained from another targeted employee were used to access and decrypt some storage volumes.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "isolate cloud storage access keys and decryption keys from developer and workstation environments, and bind them to short-lived, narrowly scoped identities",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://web.archive.org/web/2023/https://blog.lastpass.com/2022/12/notice-of-recent-security-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "redmart-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "RedMart Limited",
   "disclosed": "2022-12-19",
   "incident_window": "September 2020; database exfiltrated 6 September 2020",
   "cloud": "AWS and Alibaba Cloud",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states a MongoDB database in the company's Alibaba cloud environment was exfiltrated; its table lists 898,791 affected individuals across customer and seller accounts, with names, emails, contact numbers, addresses, partial credit card details, hashed passwords and call recording links.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says a threat actor gained unauthorised access to the GitHub account of a member of the DevOps team, found a high-privilege key to the AWS environment in the repositories, used it to find a second key in a private S3 bucket, created an EC2 instance, and crossed a VPN link to the Alibaba cloud database. The database was neither encrypted nor password protected.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "keep privileged keys out of code repositories, require MFA on every developer account, and require authentication and encryption on databases even behind private links",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/438fd68d-bcd9-4d25-8f77-09268e80a4e4"
  },
  {
   "slug": "rackspace-hosted-exchange-2022",
   "organization": "Rackspace Technology, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2022-12-06",
   "incident_window": "Not stated; the December 9, 2022 update refers to the recent ransomware incident",
   "cloud": "Rackspace Hosted Exchange",
   "exposed": "The filing says a ransomware incident affected the company's Hosted Exchange email business, a managed email solution for small and medium businesses, and that the incident was limited solely to that product (about 1 percent of annual revenue). It says affected customers were being moved to Microsoft Office 365. What data was taken is not public.",
   "access_gained": "The filing does not say how access was gained. How access was gained is not public.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "not public (the sources do not state how access was gained)",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1810019/000119312522301429/d429186d8k.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "farrer-park-hospital-pdpc-2018",
   "organization": "Farrer Park Hospital Pte Ltd",
   "disclosed": "2022-11-18",
   "incident_window": "8 March 2018 to 25 October 2019",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states 9,271 emails were automatically forwarded from two employees' Microsoft Office 365 mailboxes to a third-party address, disclosing the personal data of 3,539 individuals, 1,923 of them with medical information.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the two mailboxes had been configured to forward all incoming emails to a third party. It was found on 24 October 2019 when Office 365 restricted the accounts, which the decision describes as a security feature indicating unauthorised access. The decision does not state how the forwarding was set up; multi-factor authentication was not in place when it began in March 2018.",
   "access_path": "not-public",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "disable automatic external mail forwarding by default, require MFA for all mailboxes, and alert on new forwarding rules",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/685c6f15-4fd9-49be-88e4-b86975ce7974"
  },
  {
   "slug": "dropbox-github-phishing-2022",
   "organization": "Dropbox",
   "disclosed": "2022-11-01",
   "incident_window": "October 2022 (GitHub alert 2022-10-14, activity began the previous day)",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "The company stated that the threat actor copied 130 code repositories containing some credentials (primarily API keys) and a few thousand names and email addresses; no customer content, passwords or payment information was accessed.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that employees received phishing emails impersonating a CI service, and that a fake login page collected GitHub credentials and a one-time code, giving the threat actor access to one GitHub organization.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant authentication (WebAuthn) for source-control accounts and keep API keys out of repositories",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://dropbox.tech/security/a-recent-phishing-campaign-targeting-dropbox"
  },
  {
   "slug": "chegg-ftc-2022",
   "organization": "Chegg",
   "disclosed": "2022-10-31",
   "incident_window": "2017 to 2020 (four breaches per the FTC; the cloud database breach followed the September 2017 incident by less than a year)",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The FTC stated that a third-party cloud database held personal information of approximately 40 million customers, including names, email addresses and passwords and, for certain users, scholarship data.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC stated that a former contractor used login information the company shared with employees and outside contractors to access one of Chegg's third-party cloud databases.",
   "access_path": "retained-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "issue individual, revocable credentials to contractors, remove access at offboarding, and require MFA for access to cloud databases",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://web.archive.org/web/2023/https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/10/ftc-brings-action-against-ed-tech-provider-chegg-careless-security-exposed-personal-data-millions"
  },
  {
   "slug": "drizly-ftc-2022",
   "organization": "Drizly",
   "disclosed": "2022-10-24",
   "incident_window": "April 2018 (executive granted GitHub repository access) and early July 2020 (intrusion)",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The FTC complaint stated that Drizly's databases held personal information of more than 2.5 million consumers, that the intruder took a user table of more than 2.5 million records, and that the company hosted its production database on Amazon RDS, an AWS service.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC complaint stated that in early July 2020 a malicious actor reused credentials from an unrelated breach to reach an executive's GitHub account, found AWS and database credentials stored in the company's GitHub repositories, and used them to change the company's AWS security settings and reach the production environment.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "require MFA on source-control accounts, never store cloud credentials in repositories, and limit employee access to personal data",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/202-3185-Drizly-Complaint.pdf"
  },
  {
   "slug": "microsoft-misconfigured-endpoint-2022",
   "organization": "Microsoft (misconfigured storage endpoint)",
   "disclosed": "2022-10-19",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The post-mortem says business transaction data (names, email addresses, email content, company names, phone numbers and possibly attached files) from interactions between Microsoft and prospective customers could be reached without authentication; it says the scope reported by the researchers was exaggerated and does not give its own count.",
   "access_gained": "The post-mortem says an unintentional misconfiguration on an endpoint, not a security vulnerability, allowed unauthenticated access; the endpoint is now accessible only with authentication.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "deny anonymous access to storage endpoints by default and continuously scan for publicly reachable storage",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://web.archive.org/web/2022/https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/10/19/investigation-regarding-misconfigured-microsoft-storage-location-2/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "uber-2022",
   "organization": "Uber",
   "disclosed": "2022-09-16",
   "incident_window": "September 2022",
   "cloud": "Google Workspace",
   "exposed": "The company stated that the attacker accessed several internal systems, downloaded some internal Slack messages, accessed information from an internal finance tool and its HackerOne dashboard, and that it had not found access to customer or user data held by its cloud providers.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that an attacker likely bought a contractor's corporate password after malware on the contractor's personal device exposed it, then repeated two-factor login requests until the contractor accepted one.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant MFA that cannot be satisfied by an approval prompt, and rate-limit and alert on repeated MFA requests",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.uber.com/newsroom/security-update/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "github-circleci-phishing-2022",
   "organization": "GitHub users (phishing campaign reported by GitHub)",
   "disclosed": "2022-09-16",
   "incident_window": "From September 2022",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "GitHub stated that the campaign affected many victim organizations, and that in many cases the threat actor downloaded private repository contents accessible to the compromised user; GitHub itself was not affected.",
   "access_gained": "GitHub stated that a phishing site imitating the GitHub login page stole credentials and relayed TOTP codes to the threat actor in real time, and that accounts protected by hardware security keys were not vulnerable.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require hardware security keys or other phishing-resistant authentication for source-control accounts",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://github.blog/2022-09-16-security-alert-new-phishing-campaign-targets-github-users/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "myrepublic-pdpc-2021",
   "organization": "MyRepublic Limited",
   "disclosed": "2022-09-15",
   "incident_window": "29 August 2021 (discovered)",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states the personal data of 79,388 customers was accessed and exfiltrated: scanned copies of identity cards and work passes submitted as KYC documents and number portability documents.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the Mobile Order Portal stored KYC documents in a bucket on AWS cloud storage, and the bucket's access key sat in the portal's source code. The external actor used the key to access the bucket. The company could not determine with certainty how the key was obtained but found it was disclosed in a portal page showing technical information and in a source repository open to all its developers.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "keep storage keys out of source code and technical debug pages, restrict repository access to those who need it, and use short-lived scoped credentials for storage access",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/652104b6-c8a1-4a7e-bc7c-2e1b4d87679b"
  },
  {
   "slug": "mailchimp-crypto-social-engineering-2022",
   "organization": "Mailchimp (Intuit)",
   "disclosed": "2022-08-12",
   "incident_window": "August 8 to August 2022 (the company)",
   "cloud": "Mailchimp",
   "exposed": "The company stated 214 Mailchimp accounts were affected, in a targeted incident focused on users in industries related to cryptocurrency and finance.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated an unauthorized actor accessed an internal tool used by customer-facing teams for customer support and account administration, after a social engineering attack on Mailchimp employees that obtained employee credentials.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant MFA for support staff and limit what a support tool can do to customer accounts",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://mailchimp.com/august-2022-security-incident/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "cisco-google-account-vishing-2022",
   "organization": "Cisco Systems",
   "disclosed": "2022-08-10",
   "incident_window": "Cisco became aware of a potential compromise on May 24, 2022",
   "cloud": "Box",
   "exposed": "The company stated the only successful data exfiltration was the contents of a Box folder associated with a compromised employee's account and employee authentication data from Active Directory, and that the Box data was not sensitive.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated an employee's credentials were compromised after an attacker gained control of a personal Google account to which credentials saved in the browser were synchronised, and the attacker then used voice phishing and repeated multi-factor push requests until one was accepted, which gave access to the VPN.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, block saving of work credentials in personal browser profiles, and alert on new device enrolment for MFA",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/recent-cyber-attack/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "cloudflare-phishing-2022",
   "organization": "Cloudflare",
   "disclosed": "2022-08-09",
   "incident_window": "From 2022-07-20 (phishing messages began that day)",
   "cloud": "Okta",
   "exposed": "The company stated that no Cloudflare systems were compromised.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that employees received text messages pointing to a look-alike page for its identity provider, which asked for a username, password and a one-time code; individual employees did enter credentials, but physical security keys required for its applications stopped the attacker.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "issue physical security keys to every employee and require them for all applications so that relayed passwords and one-time codes cannot be used",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://blog.cloudflare.com/2022-07-sms-phishing-attacks/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "twilio-2022",
   "organization": "Twilio",
   "disclosed": "2022-08-07",
   "incident_window": "August 2022 (company became aware 2022-08-04)",
   "cloud": "Twilio",
   "exposed": "The company stated that 163 Twilio customers, out of a customer base of over 270,000, had data accessed without authorization, and that 93 individual Authy users, out of approximately 75 million, had additional devices registered to their accounts.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that text messages sent to current and former employees led some of them to a page impersonating the Twilio sign-in page, and that the attackers used the stolen credentials to reach internal systems.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant MFA (hardware-bound credentials) for every workforce identity with access to customer data systems",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.twilio.com/blog/august-2022-social-engineering-attack"
  },
  {
   "slug": "crawfort-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "Crawfort Pte. Ltd.",
   "disclosed": "2022-07-14",
   "incident_window": "about 15 April 2020 (one-week migration window); dark web sale notified 9 June 2021",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states the personal data of 5,421 customers was affected: images of identity cards, PDF loan contracts and income documents.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the company opened an S3 server port in its AWS environment for one week during a data migration, and that the S3 bucket holding the data was publicly accessible due to a misconfiguration. It states the threat actor gained access to the public bucket in that period.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "exposed-network-service",
   "control_kind": "require a risk review before temporary changes to cloud storage, block public access on buckets, and alert on any opened ports or public buckets",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/e476cec1-2618-4d2d-b837-99109a8a97f4"
  },
  {
   "slug": "quoine-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "Quoine Pte Ltd",
   "disclosed": "2022-07-14",
   "incident_window": "13 to 17 November 2020",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states the personal data of 652,564 customers was accessed and exfiltrated, including names, addresses, emails, identity document images for 362,035 customers, transaction information and bank account details.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says social engineering of employees of the company's domain registrar led to control of its domain hosting account being handed to an external actor, who redirected the company's mail, reset the password of a DevOps account, and used the reset credentials to reach the company's cloud computing platform, which held API keys to its databases.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "require strong identity checks and MFA on domain and registrar accounts, keep API keys out of reach of a single automation account, and monitor mail routing changes",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/5ac38f55-f48d-47af-9988-b926bb999b03"
  },
  {
   "slug": "wegmans-azure-containers-2021",
   "organization": "Wegmans",
   "disclosed": "2022-06-30",
   "incident_window": "container misconfigured from January 2018 to April 2021; a second from November 2018, as the release says",
   "cloud": "Microsoft Azure",
   "exposed": "The release says a database backup with over three million records of customer email addresses and account passwords sat in the first container; a second container held a database with customers’ names, email addresses and mailing addresses; the release puts the total at more than three million consumers, including more than 830,000 New Yorkers.",
   "access_gained": "A security researcher told the company in April 2021 that a cloud storage container hosted on Microsoft Azure was open to public access; the release says a second container had been public since November 2018.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "block public access at the storage-account level, deny it by policy and alert on any container that becomes reachable without authentication",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2022/attorney-general-james-secures-400000-wegmans-after-data-breach-exposed-consumers"
  },
  {
   "slug": "wegmans-azure-container-2018",
   "organization": "Wegmans Food Markets, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2022-06-30",
   "incident_window": "January 2018 to April 2021 (the container was misconfigured from its creation in January 2018 until April 2021, per the New York Attorney General)",
   "cloud": "Microsoft Azure",
   "exposed": "The New York Attorney General states the data of more than three million consumers nationwide, including more than 830,000 New Yorkers, was exposed, including a database backup file with over three million records of customer email addresses and account passwords.",
   "access_gained": "The New York Attorney General states that in April 2021 a security researcher informed the company that a cloud storage container hosted on Microsoft Azure was left unsecured and open to public access. The Attorney General’s office found the company failed to configure the container to limit access, to inventory its cloud assets, to secure all user passwords and to regularly conduct security testing of its cloud assets.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "keep an inventory of cloud storage, deny anonymous access to storage containers by default, and continuously test storage configuration for public exposure",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2022/attorney-general-james-secures-400000-wegmans-after-data-breach-exposed-consumers"
  },
  {
   "slug": "mgm-resorts-opc-2019",
   "organization": "MGM Resorts International",
   "disclosed": "2022-05-19",
   "incident_window": "about 7 July 2019 (access); offered for sale from about 10 July 2019",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The OPC finding states MGM confirmed 1,934,090 Canadians were affected, including 5,635 whose government identifier (such as passport, Nexus, health card or military identification number) was compromised; the data set held names, dates of birth, phone numbers, emails and residence addresses.",
   "access_gained": "The OPC finding, relaying MGM's account, says an unauthorized actor logged into a third-party platform used by MGM software developers with an MGM employee's credentials compromised in an earlier unrelated breach, exploited a coding flaw on that platform to bypass multi-factor authentication, found a temporary access token, and used it to reach guest data on an external cloud server for about one hour.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant MFA that cannot be bypassed on any platform developers use, block reuse of breached passwords, and limit and expire access tokens for cloud data stores",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2022/pipeda-2022-004/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "geniusu-pdpc-2021",
   "organization": "GeniusU Pte. Ltd.",
   "disclosed": "2022-04-21",
   "incident_window": "before 12 January 2021",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states about 1.26 million users' first and last name, email address, location and last sign-in IP address were accessed and exfiltrated from a staging application database.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the likely cause was a compromise of a developer's GitHub password, which let the threat actor into the company's GitHub environment; database login credentials had been stored in the codebase there, so the actor reached and exfiltrated the database. The staging database held real personal data.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "keep database credentials out of code repositories, require MFA on every developer account, and keep real personal data out of test environments",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/18345b54-0db6-468a-b967-f83664d09ec2"
  },
  {
   "slug": "heroku-travisci-oauth-2022",
   "organization": "Heroku (Salesforce) and Travis CI OAuth tokens",
   "disclosed": "2022-04-15",
   "incident_window": "April 2022 (Heroku: 2022-04-07 to 2022-04-13)",
   "cloud": "GitHub",
   "exposed": "GitHub stated that stolen OAuth user tokens issued to Heroku and Travis CI were used to download data from dozens of organizations, including npm; Heroku stated the actor also downloaded stored customer GitHub integration tokens and a database of pipeline-level config variables.",
   "access_gained": "Heroku stated that initial access to its environment was obtained by using a compromised token for a Heroku machine account, after which stored customer GitHub integration OAuth tokens were downloaded; GitHub stated the tokens were then abused against GitHub.com.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "scope and shorten the lifetime of machine-account and integration tokens, store third-party OAuth tokens encrypted with separate keys, and prefer sender-constrained tokens",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://blog.heroku.com/april-2022-incident-review | company-statement: https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "okta-sitel-2022",
   "organization": "Okta (contractor Sitel)",
   "disclosed": "2022-03-22",
   "incident_window": "January 2022 (alert raised 2022-01-20)",
   "cloud": "Okta",
   "exposed": "The post-mortem says screenshots were taken from a Sitel support engineer's computer; it states a maximum potential impact of 366 customers (approximately 2.5%) and that the Okta service was not breached.",
   "access_gained": "The post-mortem says an attacker obtained remote access, using RDP, to a computer owned and managed by Okta's sub-processor Sitel and used by a customer support engineer; the attacker did not take over an Okta account.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require contractor-managed endpoints to meet the same hardening as employer-managed ones, and block remote-desktop access from the internet to devices that hold sessions to the identity provider",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://www.okta.com/blog/2022/03/oktas-investigation-of-the-january-2022-compromise/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "microsoft-dev-0537-2022",
   "organization": "Microsoft",
   "disclosed": "2022-03-22",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The company stated that the actor claimed to have exfiltrated portions of source code, that no customer code or data was involved, and that a single account had been compromised, granting limited access.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that a single account was compromised, granting limited access, and that the tactics used in this intrusion reflect those described in the same post (including stolen credentials and MFA prompt abuse).",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant MFA, block MFA approval prompts and session-token replay, and limit what a single account can reach",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "alfi-former-executives-cloud-lockout-2022",
   "organization": "Alfi, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2022-02-23",
   "incident_window": "After the executives were placed on leave on October 22, 2021 (the dates of the access are not stated)",
   "cloud": "Amazon Web Services",
   "exposed": "The filing says the company's Google Workspace (email accounts, calendars, contacts, chats and saved files) and its Amazon Web Services account (which hosts tablet data and a software development platform) were taken over so the company could not administer them, that downloadable access to all data in the Google Workspace was obtained from Google, and that files were accessed and downloaded from the company's Google Drive. The filing says the company continued business through workarounds.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says that after the executives were placed on leave and told not to access the company's computer systems or platforms, one of them took control of the Google Workspace and Amazon Web Services accounts, and two others accessed and downloaded files from Google Drive.",
   "access_path": "retained-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "revoke administrator and root credentials, cloud console access and data export rights on the day an executive or administrator is placed on leave or leaves, and keep break-glass admin accounts under separate control",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1833908/000110465922026150/tm227500d1_8k.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "ubiquiti-aws-github-2020",
   "organization": "A publicly traded wireless communications manufacturer (called Company-1 in the U.S. Attorney release)",
   "disclosed": "2021-12-01",
   "incident_window": "about December 2020, as the release says",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The release says gigabytes of confidential data were downloaded from the company’s AWS and GitHub infrastructure and later used in an extortion attempt for millions of dollars.",
   "access_gained": "The release says an employee who was a senior developer held credentials for the company’s AWS and GitHub servers and repeatedly misused his administrative access to download the data; the company’s own account of an outside intruder was, the release says, false.",
   "access_path": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "limit cloud administrator and source-control privileges to the smallest set of people, require approval for bulk exports, and alert on large downloads by administrative identities",
   "sources": "court-document: https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-employee-technology-company-charged-stealing-confidential-data-and-extorting"
  },
  {
   "slug": "godaddy-managed-wordpress-2021",
   "organization": "GoDaddy",
   "disclosed": "2021-11-22",
   "incident_window": "2021-09-06 to 2021-11-17",
   "cloud": "GoDaddy Managed WordPress hosting",
   "exposed": "The company stated that up to 1.2 million active and inactive Managed WordPress customers had email address and customer number exposed, along with the original WordPress admin password, sFTP and database credentials for active customers, and the SSL private key for a subset.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that an unauthorized third party used a compromised password to access the provisioning system in the legacy code base for Managed WordPress.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require MFA on provisioning and administrative systems, including legacy ones, and avoid retaining reusable customer credentials after provisioning",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1609711/000160971121000122/gddyblogpostnov222021.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "commeasure-reddoorz-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "Commeasure Pte Ltd (operates the RedDoorz booking platform)",
   "disclosed": "2021-11-11",
   "incident_window": "September 2020 (customers notified 26 September 2020)",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states a database of 5,892,843 customer records (name, contact number, email, date of birth, hashed password and booking information) was accessed and exfiltrated; masked credit card numbers were not accessed.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the threat actors most likely obtained an AWS access key embedded in an Android application package, created in 2015, last updated in January 2018, still downloadable from the Google Play Store, and marked as a test key although it could reach a live production database in Amazon RDS.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "keep cloud access keys out of mobile app packages and code, scope keys to the least access needed, and retire old app builds and the keys inside them",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/f78cffe6-5efe-4757-b141-2d273702b812"
  },
  {
   "slug": "stylez-icompare-pdpc-2019",
   "organization": "Stylez Pte Ltd",
   "disclosed": "2021-10-14",
   "incident_window": "before December 2019",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states a testing database (a text file of renovation and interior design clients, 2009 to 2016) exposing the name, email address and phone number of 9,983 individuals was uploaded to the dark web.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the testing database was hosted on a cloud server leased from a cloud storage service provider, stored in a publicly accessible directory without access controls, so it was reachable from the internet and was crawled and indexed by search engines.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "do not keep copies of production data in test environments, put access controls on every web-reachable directory, and scan for exposed files",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/37845a6b-efc4-426d-bc1f-58e4e7da59ff"
  },
  {
   "slug": "national-kidney-foundation-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "The National Kidney Foundation",
   "disclosed": "2021-10-14",
   "incident_window": "14 to 17 May 2020",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states the mailbox of one employee held 23,145 emails with the personal data of approximately 500 individuals (patients, employees and third parties), including bank account numbers, dialysis readings and medical conditions. It states the mailbox was believed to have been downloaded in full.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says an employee received a phishing email linking to a website that asked for account credentials; the hacker is believed to have obtained them, accessed the employee's mailbox, which was hosted on Microsoft Office 365 and reachable by webmail, synchronised it on 17 May 2020, and used it to send phishing emails to 1,039 external contacts.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant MFA for web mail, restrict mailbox access to managed devices, and keep sensitive records out of mailboxes",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/8238cce1-16fd-4cec-b9ab-ffd8e8445a7b"
  },
  {
   "slug": "sendtech-pdpc-2021",
   "organization": "Sendtech Pte. Ltd.",
   "disclosed": "2021-09-21",
   "incident_window": "access key created in 2015 and not rotated since; discovered 10 February 2021",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states the personal data of 64,196 customers and 3,401 contractors and the contractors' employees was accessed: for customers the email address, contact number, home address and last four digits of the card; for contractors and their employees a profile photo and copies of the NRIC or work permit. It states there was no evidence of data exfiltration.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the cause was a compromised AWS access key created in 2015 and not rotated since. With it the attacker gained admin privileges, created another admin account and queried the buckets storing personal data. The company suspected the key could have been compromised through former or current employees but the decision does not confirm how.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "retained-access",
   "control_kind": "rotate long-lived cloud access keys on a schedule, remove keys that former developers could have held, and alert on new administrator accounts created with a key",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/51342b7d-edaf-484b-82d5-e0dec632f4fc"
  },
  {
   "slug": "cetera-email-account-takeovers-2017",
   "organization": "Cetera Entities (Cetera Advisor Networks LLC, Cetera Investment Services LLC, Cetera Financial Specialists LLC, Cetera Advisors LLC, Cetera Investment Advisers LLC)",
   "disclosed": "2021-08-30",
   "incident_window": "November 2017 to June 2020",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The SEC states personally identifying information of at least 4,388 customers and clients was exposed.",
   "access_gained": "The SEC states the cloud-based email accounts of over 60 personnel were taken over by unauthorized third parties, and that none of the taken over accounts were protected in a manner consistent with the firms’ policies. The press release does not name the email provider or state how the accounts were taken over.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication on every cloud-hosted email account and block legacy sign-in methods that bypass it",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021-169"
  },
  {
   "slug": "cambridge-email-account-takeovers-2018",
   "organization": "Cambridge Investment Research Inc. and Cambridge Investment Research Advisors Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2021-08-30",
   "incident_window": "January 2018 to July 2021",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The SEC states personally identifying information of at least 2,177 customers and clients was exposed.",
   "access_gained": "The SEC states the cloud-based email accounts of over 121 representatives were taken over by unauthorized third parties. The SEC order finds the firm discovered the first takeover in January 2018 but did not adopt and implement firm-wide enhanced security measures for those accounts until 2021. The press release does not name the email provider or state how the accounts were taken over.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication on every cloud-hosted email account and block legacy sign-in methods that bypass it",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021-169"
  },
  {
   "slug": "kms-financial-email-account-takeovers-2018",
   "organization": "KMS Financial Services Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2021-08-30",
   "incident_window": "September 2018 to December 2019",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The SEC states personally identifying information of approximately 4,900 customers and clients was exposed.",
   "access_gained": "The SEC states the cloud-based email accounts of 15 financial advisers or their assistants were taken over by unauthorized third parties. The SEC order finds the firm did not adopt written policies requiring additional firm-wide security measures until May 2020 and did not fully implement them firm-wide until August 2020. The press release does not name the email provider or state how the accounts were taken over.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication on every cloud-hosted email account and block legacy sign-in methods that bypass it",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021-169"
  },
  {
   "slug": "azure-cosmosdb-chaosdb-2021",
   "organization": "Microsoft (Azure Cosmos DB)",
   "disclosed": "2021-08-27",
   "incident_window": "Researcher activity between 2021-08-07 and 2021-08-13",
   "cloud": "Microsoft Azure",
   "exposed": "The post-mortem says primary read-write keys of a subset of Azure Cosmos DB customers could be reached, customers were notified to regenerate keys, and no customer data was accessed by third parties or security researchers.",
   "access_gained": "The post-mortem says a vulnerability in the Azure Cosmos DB Jupyter Notebook feature could allow a user to gain access to another customer's resources by using the account's primary read-write key.",
   "access_path": "cross-tenant",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "use role-based access control and network restrictions instead of account-wide keys, and rotate account keys on a schedule",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://web.archive.org/web/2021/https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/08/27/update-on-vulnerability-in-the-azure-cosmos-db-jupyter-notebook-feature/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "codecov-2021",
   "organization": "Codecov",
   "disclosed": "2021-04-15",
   "incident_window": "31 January 2021 to 1 April 2021",
   "cloud": "Codecov",
   "exposed": "The company stated that credentials, tokens or keys that customers passed through their CI runner, and the git remote information of repositories using the Bash Uploaders, could have been exported; it counts 108 windows of time in which the altered script was live between 31 January and 1 April.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that an error in its Docker image creation process allowed the actor to extract the credential required to modify the Bash Uploader script, which was then altered to send CI environment variables to a third-party server.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "keep signing and publishing credentials out of build artefacts and container images, scope them to a single task, and verify checksums of scripts fetched into CI",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://about.codecov.io/security-update/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "mimecast-solarwinds-certificate-2021",
   "organization": "Mimecast",
   "disclosed": "2021-03-16",
   "incident_window": "Became aware in January 2021; forensic investigation completed in March 2021 (per the company)",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "The company stated the threat actor accessed certain Mimecast-issued certificates and related customer server connection information, a subset of email addresses and other contact information, hashed and salted credentials, and a limited number of source code repositories. It stated Microsoft informed it that a certificate used to authenticate some Mimecast products to Microsoft 365 Exchange Web Services was used to connect to a low single-digit number of mutual customers' Microsoft 365 tenants. It stated it had no evidence that email or archive content held for customers was accessed.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated the threat actor used the SolarWinds supply-chain compromise to gain access to part of its production grid environment, and from there accessed Mimecast-issued certificates and related connection information; the certificate was then used against a small number of customer Microsoft 365 tenants.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "restrict and monitor vendor-issued certificates and service credentials used to reach customer tenants, rotate them on any supplier compromise, and move to scoped token-based authorisation instead of long-lived certificates",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://web.archive.org/web/20210317013526/https://www.mimecast.com/incident-report/ | regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1644675/000119312521082200/d141664dex992.htm"
  },
  {
   "slug": "skymed-ftc-2020",
   "organization": "SkyMed International, Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2020-12-16",
   "incident_window": "not public",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The FTC states the company left unsecured a cloud database containing 130,000 membership records. According to the complaint, the database held names, dates of birth, home addresses, health information and membership account numbers in plain text.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC press release says the database was unsecured and exposed by a security researcher, and that it could be located and accessed by anyone on the Internet. The press release says the company deleted the database after confirming that the data was online and publicly accessible.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "block public access to cloud databases by default, alert on any data store that becomes reachable from the internet, and encrypt personal data at rest",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/12/company-provides-travel-emergency-services-settles-ftc-allegations-it-failed-secure-sensitive"
  },
  {
   "slug": "ascension-data-2019",
   "organization": "Ascension Data & Analytics",
   "disclosed": "2020-12-15",
   "incident_window": "January 2018 to about January 2019 (per the FTC complaint)",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "Mortgage documents relating to approximately 37,000 mortgages, containing information about 60,593 consumers: names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, loan information, credit and debit account numbers, drivers license numbers, credit files and other personal and financial information. The complaint says approximately 52 unauthorized IP addresses accessed the server and storage location.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC complaint says a vendor hired for text recognition scanning stored the documents on a cloud-based server and a separate cloud-based storage location, misconfigured both, and left the information exposed to anyone on the internet; no password was required. The complaint says the respondent did not assess the vendor's security measures.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "assess a vendor's security before sharing sensitive documents, and block anonymous read access on cloud servers and storage that hold them",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1923126ascension_complaint.pdf | regulator-filing: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/12/mortgage-analytics-company-settles-ftc-allegations-it-failed-ensure-vendor-was-adequately-protecting"
  },
  {
   "slug": "solarwinds-2020",
   "organization": "SolarWinds",
   "disclosed": "2020-12-14",
   "incident_window": "Orion updates released between March and June 2020 (the filing's Relevant Period)",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "The filing says a vulnerability was inserted in Orion monitoring product updates; fewer than 18,000 of approximately 33,000 notified Orion customers may have had an installation containing it. The filing also says the company's own Microsoft Office 365 email was compromised and that it had uncovered no evidence at that time of exfiltration of customer, personnel or other data. The Microsoft post describes actions in the Microsoft cloud against customer tenants.",
   "access_gained": "The filing says the vulnerability was introduced as a result of a compromise of the Orion software build system, and that the company was made aware of an attack vector used to compromise its Office 365 emails. The Microsoft post says that in actions observed in the Microsoft cloud, attackers gained administrative access either using compromised privileged account credentials (for example stolen passwords) or by forging SAML tokens using compromised token signing certificates.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "control_kind": "treat vendor-supplied software updates as untrusted: restrict the network reach and privileges of vendor management tools, and protect federation signing keys and administrative identities with hardware-backed storage and strong authentication",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000162828020017451/swi-20201214.htm | provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2020/12/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks"
  },
  {
   "slug": "chan-brothers-travel-pdpc-2019",
   "organization": "Chan Brothers Travel Pte Ltd",
   "disclosed": "2020-10-16",
   "incident_window": "March 2018 to May 2019",
   "cloud": "Salesforce",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states the personal data of an estimated 5,593 individuals (names, email addresses and mobile numbers submitted through enquiry and feedback forms) was indexed, cached and searchable through web search engines.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the company hosted its site on Salesforce Community Cloud with the access configuration set to Public. A March 2018 release added an automated search engine optimisation feature, and the forms inherited the public setting, so the data was indexed. The company said it received no notice of the release; the decision found the release notes were published.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "review default visibility settings after each SaaS feature release, keep forms collecting personal data private, and monitor vendor release notes",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/c4b13045-2ac1-42e8-bd76-b17f43d1ad47"
  },
  {
   "slug": "mri-diagnostics-clarity-radiology-pdpc-2018",
   "organization": "MRI Diagnostics Pte Ltd and Clarity Radiology Pte Ltd",
   "disclosed": "2020-10-16",
   "incident_window": "reported 7 November 2018",
   "cloud": "not public",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states three Excel spreadsheets exposing the names, identity card numbers and type of radiology scan of approximately 4,099 individuals were accessible over the internet.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the clinic subscribed to an internet-based teleradiology system provided by Clarity Radiology, a cloud-based software service, which engaged an overseas vendor to maintain it. The vendor removed access restrictions on a network folder to patch the system and did not restore them, so the spreadsheets were indexed by search engines.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "third-party-access",
   "control_kind": "restore and verify access controls after maintenance, require vendors to document change and rollback steps, and scan for publicly indexed files",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/567882ff-bcde-4d39-a654-eae013e5889b"
  },
  {
   "slug": "singapore-medical-association-pdpc-2020",
   "organization": "Singapore Medical Association",
   "disclosed": "2020-09-10",
   "incident_window": "28 to 30 January 2020",
   "cloud": "Microsoft 365",
   "exposed": "The PDPC decision states the personal data of 68 individuals in 137 emails (identity card numbers, dates of birth, indemnity coverage details, education and financial transaction information) was forwarded to an external address.",
   "access_gained": "The decision says the association believed an unauthorised user entered a Microsoft Office 365 email account by a brute force attack but had no logs to confirm, then created a rule forwarding received emails to an external address. The account password had not been changed since November 2013 and there were no measures against repeated login attempts.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require MFA on every mailbox, lock out repeated failed sign-ins, and alert on new mail forwarding rules",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/assets/6db1d4a3-1e2f-4271-a7b6-292bfed8bfa1"
  },
  {
   "slug": "cisco-webex-aws-2018",
   "organization": "Cisco Systems",
   "disclosed": "2020-08-26",
   "incident_window": "September 24, 2018",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The press release says 456 virtual machines for the WebEx Teams application were deleted and over 16,000 WebEx Teams accounts were shut down for up to two weeks. It says the company spent approximately $1,400,000 in employee time and refunded over $1,000,000 to affected customers, and that no customer data was compromised.",
   "access_gained": "The Department of Justice says that under the plea agreement an individual who had worked for Cisco and resigned in approximately April 2018 admitted intentionally accessing Cisco's cloud infrastructure hosted by Amazon Web Services without permission on September 24, 2018, and deployed code from a Google Cloud Project account that deleted the virtual machines.",
   "access_path": "retained-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "remove cloud access for departing staff on their last day and regularly review identities, keys and tokens that belong to former employees and contractors",
   "sources": "court-document: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network"
  },
  {
   "slug": "twilio-2020",
   "organization": "Twilio",
   "disclosed": "2020-07-22",
   "incident_window": "July 19, 2020 1:12 PM PDT to July 20, 2020 10:30 PM PDT (window for downloads of the modified library, per the company)",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "A modified version (v1.20) of the TaskRouter JS SDK hosted on the company's content domain. The company stated it had no evidence that any customer data was accessed and that no malicious party had access to its internal systems, code or data; customers who downloaded v1.20 in the window were asked to replace it.",
   "access_gained": "The company's incident report says a misconfiguration in the S3 bucket hosting the library let a bad actor inject code, and that the access policy for the path storing the SDK allowed anybody on the Internet to read and write to that path.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "deny public write access on storage that serves code to customers, audit bucket policies on a schedule, and publish integrity checks for served scripts",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.twilio.com/en-us/blog/company/communications/incident-report-taskrouter-js-sdk-july-2020"
  },
  {
   "slug": "twitter-2020",
   "organization": "Twitter",
   "disclosed": "2020-07-18",
   "incident_window": "July 15, 2020",
   "cloud": "Twitter",
   "exposed": "The company stated attackers targeted 130 Twitter accounts, tweeted from 45, accessed the direct message inbox of 36 and downloaded the Twitter Data of 7.",
   "access_gained": "The company says a phone spear phishing attack targeted a small number of employees; the attackers used the employees' credentials to access internal systems, including getting through two-factor protections, then used the credentials of employees with access to account support tools.",
   "access_path": "stolen-user-credentials",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for every identity with access to internal support tools, with a second approver for account-changing actions",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://web.archive.org/web/20200801/https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update-on-our-security-incident"
  },
  {
   "slug": "blackbaud-2020",
   "organization": "Blackbaud Inc.",
   "disclosed": "2020-07-16",
   "incident_window": "Early 2020; the FTC says the intrusion went undetected for three months",
   "cloud": "Blackbaud (software provider; the New York Attorney General calls it a cloud company)",
   "exposed": "The SEC states the attacker accessed and exfiltrated donor bank account information and Social Security numbers, and that more than 13,000 customers were impacted. The FTC states the personal data of millions of consumers, including Social Security and bank account numbers, was removed unencrypted. The New York Attorney General states the breach exposed personal information of customers and millions of their donors and constituents.",
   "access_gained": "The FTC press release says that, according to the complaint, a hacker in early 2020 accessed a customer’s Blackbaud-hosted database and, once logged in, moved across multiple Blackbaud-hosted environments by using existing vulnerabilities and local administrator accounts and by creating new administrator accounts. The FTC says the company failed to segment data, adequately implement multifactor authentication and monitor for breach attempts. The company paid a ransom of 24 Bitcoin, according to the FTC.",
   "access_path": "over-permissioned-identity",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "segment hosted customer environments from one another, limit local administrator accounts, require multifactor authentication on every identity with access to hosted data, and monitor administrator account creation",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/02/ftc-order-will-require-blackbaud-delete-unnecessary-data-boost-safeguards-settle-charges-its-lax | regulator-filing: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-48 | regulator-filing: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-and-multistate-coalition-secure-495-million-cloud-company"
  },
  {
   "slug": "liveauctioneers-2020",
   "organization": "LiveAuctioneers",
   "disclosed": "2020-07-11",
   "incident_window": "June 19, 2020 to July 11, 2020 (Washington Attorney General record)",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The company's letter says 38,523 Washington residents were involved; the user database held names, email addresses (user names), MD5-hashed passwords, contact details, IP addresses used to create accounts and records of past sales transactions. It says no Social Security numbers or financial data were collected.",
   "access_gained": "The company's letter to the Washington Attorney General says a hacker breached one of its third-party software solutions and obtained a source control key, which gave access to its source repository, its cloud-based storage environment and its production database, then used internal users' credentials to download the user database.",
   "access_path": "third-party-access",
   "access_path_secondary": "leaked-access-key",
   "control_kind": "scope and rotate source-control keys issued to third-party tools, keep production credentials out of repositories, and alert on bulk database reads",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/databreach/BreachM10283.pdf | regulator-filing: https://www.atg.wa.gov/live-auctioneers"
  },
  {
   "slug": "microsoft-support-database-2019",
   "organization": "Microsoft",
   "disclosed": "2020-01-22",
   "incident_window": "December 5, 2019 (network security group change) to December 31, 2019 (remediation)",
   "cloud": "Microsoft Azure",
   "exposed": "An internal customer support database used for support case analytics. The post says most customers did not have personally identifiable information exposed, that records are redacted with automated tools, and that some data may have remained unredacted, for example an email address written in a non-standard format. Counts: not public.",
   "access_gained": "The post says a change made to the database's network security group on December 5, 2019 contained misconfigured security rules that enabled exposure of the data. It says the investigation found no malicious use, and that the issue was specific to an internal database and does not represent an exposure of the company's commercial cloud services.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "continuously check network security rules on data stores for rules that allow unrestricted inbound access, and alert on rule changes",
   "sources": "provider-post-mortem: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2020/01/access-misconfiguration-for-customer-support-database"
  },
  {
   "slug": "imperva-2019",
   "organization": "Imperva",
   "disclosed": "2019-08-27",
   "incident_window": "October 2018 (unauthorized use of an administrative API key, per the company); the company received the data set on August 20, 2019",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "Elements of the Incapsula (Cloud WAF) customer database through September 15, 2017: email addresses and hashed and salted passwords, and for a subset of customers API keys and customer-provided SSL certificates. The company stated the exposure came from a database snapshot.",
   "access_gained": "The company's follow-up post says an unauthorized use of an administrative API key in one of its production AWS accounts led to exposure of a database snapshot. It lists the steps as a snapshot created for testing, an internal compute instance accessible from the outside world that contained an AWS API key, compromise of that instance and theft of the key, and use of the key to access the snapshot.",
   "access_path": "leaked-access-key",
   "access_path_secondary": "exposed-network-service",
   "control_kind": "keep long-lived cloud administrative keys out of compute instances, place internal instances on a private network by default, and expire or rotate keys on a schedule",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://web.archive.org/web/20191101/https://www.imperva.com/blog/ceoblog/ | company-statement: https://web.archive.org/web/20190901/https://www.imperva.com/blog/ceoblog/"
  },
  {
   "slug": "capital-one-2019",
   "organization": "Capital One",
   "disclosed": "2019-07-29",
   "incident_window": "March 22 and 23, 2019 (the company's 8-K); the company determined the incident on July 19, 2019",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The company stated the event affected approximately 100 million individuals in the United States and approximately 6 million in Canada. Credit card application data from 2005 through early 2019 (names, addresses, ZIP or postal codes, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, self-reported income), portions of credit card customer data, about 140,000 Social Security numbers and about 80,000 linked bank account numbers of US secured credit card customers, and approximately 1 million Canadian Social Insurance Numbers. The company stated no credit card account numbers or log-in credentials were compromised.",
   "access_gained": "The company stated that a highly sophisticated individual was able to exploit a specific configuration vulnerability in its infrastructure and that the issue was not specific to the cloud. The OCC consent order finds the bank failed to establish appropriate risk management for its cloud operating environment, including network security controls.",
   "access_path": "exposed-network-service",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "review and test the configuration of internet-facing request-handling components, and block workloads from reaching cloud credential services they do not need",
   "sources": "company-statement: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/927628/000092762819000262/exhibit991-pressrelease72919.htm | company-statement: https://www.capitalone.com/digital/facts2019/ | regulator-filing: https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2020-036.pdf"
  },
  {
   "slug": "online-buddies-jackd-s3-2018",
   "organization": "Online Buddies (Jack’d dating app)",
   "disclosed": "2019-06-28",
   "incident_window": "vulnerability reported to management in February 2018, as the release says",
   "cloud": "AWS",
   "exposed": "The release says private photos (which may have included nude images), public photos and personal information (location, device ID, last login date, hashed password) were at risk of unauthorized access; counts not public.",
   "access_gained": "The New York Attorney General’s investigation confirmed the company failed to secure user photos stored in an AWS S3 storage service, and left app interfaces to backend data unsecured.",
   "access_path": "public-resource",
   "access_path_secondary": "",
   "control_kind": "block public access to object storage by default, require signed access for user media and test app interfaces to backend data for authorization",
   "sources": "regulator-filing: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-settlement-dating-app-failure-secure-private-and"
  }
 ]
}