# Cloud breaches involving Okta: 7 in the ledger

Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

7 incidents in the ledger involve Okta. The most common access path among them is third-party access. The earliest was disclosed in 2022 and the latest in 2024. Each incident links to its company statement, filing, court document or post-mortem.

| Disclosed | Organization | Access path | What was exposed |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2024-02-01 | [Cloudflare](/incidents/cloudflare-thanksgiving-2023/) | Leaked access keys and secrets | The company stated the threat actor accessed some documentation and a limited amount of source code on its self-hosted Atlassian server, and that the only production systems reachable with the stolen credentials were its Atlassian environment. |
| 2023-10-23 | [1Password](/incidents/1password-okta-2023/) | Third-party access | The post says no 1Password user data was accessed and no compromise of user data or other sensitive systems was found. |
| 2023-10-20 | [Okta](/incidents/okta-support-system-2023/) | Stolen user credentials and session tokens | Okta stated that files associated with 134 customers were accessed in its customer support system; some were HAR files containing session tokens, and the threat actor used them to hijack the sessions of 5 customers. |
| 2023-10-20 | [BeyondTrust](/incidents/beyondtrust-okta-2023/) | Third-party access | The post says there was no impact or exposure to BeyondTrust’s infrastructure or customers. |
| 2023-08-29 | [Retool](/incidents/retool-2023/) | Stolen user credentials and session tokens | The company stated that 27 cloud customer accounts were accessed without authorization (account takeovers, with emails changed and passwords reset); it stated no on-prem or managed accounts were affected. |
| 2022-08-09 | [Cloudflare](/incidents/cloudflare-phishing-2022/) | Stolen user credentials and session tokens | The company stated that no Cloudflare systems were compromised. |
| 2022-03-22 | [Okta (contractor Sitel)](/incidents/okta-sitel-2022/) | Third-party access | The post-mortem says screenshots were taken from a Sitel support engineer's computer; it states a maximum potential impact of 366 customers (approximately 2.5%) and that the Okta service was not breached. |

## How access was gained, entry by entry

- [Cloudflare](/incidents/cloudflare-thanksgiving-2023/): The company stated the actor used one access token and three service account credentials taken in the October 2023 Okta compromise that the company had failed to rotate.
- [1Password](/incidents/1password-okta-2023/): The company stated it detected suspicious activity on its Okta instance used to manage employee-facing apps on September 29, and later confirmed it was a result of the provider’s Support System breach.
- [Okta](/incidents/okta-support-system-2023/): Okta stated the access used a service account stored in the support system itself, whose username and password had been saved in an employee's personal Google account on an Okta-managed laptop.
- [BeyondTrust](/incidents/beyondtrust-okta-2023/): The company stated it detected an attacker trying to access an in-house Okta administrator account using a valid session cookie stolen from the provider’s support system.
- [Retool](/incidents/retool-2023/): The company stated an employee was targeted by an SMS-based phishing attack followed by a call, and that the attacker added their own device to the employee's Okta account and used synced MFA codes to reach the VPN and internal admin systems.
- [Cloudflare](/incidents/cloudflare-phishing-2022/): The company stated that employees received text messages pointing to a look-alike page for its identity provider, which asked for a username, password and a one-time code; individual employees did enter credentials, but physical security keys required for its applications stopped the attacker.
- [Okta (contractor Sitel)](/incidents/okta-sitel-2022/): The post-mortem says an attacker obtained remote access, using RDP, to a computer owned and managed by Okta's sub-processor Sitel and used by a customer support engineer; the attacker did not take over an Okta account.

## Related pages

- [Salesforce: cloud breaches in the ledger](/clouds/salesforce/)
- [Cloud breaches: other providers and provider not public](/clouds/other/)
- [AWS: cloud breaches in the ledger](/clouds/aws/)

## Sources

- Cloudflare: https://blog.cloudflare.com/thanksgiving-2023-security-incident/ (read 16 Nov 2026)
- 1Password: https://blog.1password.com/okta-incident/ (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Okta: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/11/unauthorized-access-oktas-support-case-management-system-root-cause/ (read 16 Nov 2026)
- BeyondTrust: https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/okta-support-unit-breach (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Retool: https://retool.com/blog/mfa-isnt-mfa (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Cloudflare: https://blog.cloudflare.com/2022-07-sms-phishing-attacks/ (read 16 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/clouds/okta/
