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Cloud Security Breaches

Cloud misconfiguration breaches: incidents where a source names a configuration or scoping fault

Six ledger incidents have a primary source that names a configuration, scoping or permission fault: Microsoft's 2019 support database rules, a 2023 storage token, Amazon Q's build token, Dropbox Sign's service account, Microsoft's legacy test tenant and Capital One's configuration vulnerability. Read 16 Nov 2026.

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Six incidents where the source itself names the fault

The ledger counts an incident here only when the company, regulator or provider says the cause involved a setting, a scope or a permission. It does not infer one. The table gives each source's wording and the date it was read.

The list is of incidents. Tools that scan for such settings exist, and this page does not rank or review them.

IncidentDisclosedWhat the source saysClosest path
Microsoft customer support databaseJan 22, 2020A change to the database's network security group on December 5, 2019 contained misconfigured security rules that enabled exposure; engineers fixed it on December 31, 2019public-resource
Microsoft AI research storage accountSep 18, 2023A URL in a public GitHub repository included an overly permissive Shared Access Signature token for an internal storage accountleaked-access-key
Amazon Q Developer extensionJul 23, 2025AWS found an inappropriately scoped GitHub token in the extension's CodeBuild configurationover-permissioned-identity
Dropbox SignMay 1, 2024A compromised back-end service account held privileges across the production environmentover-permissioned-identity
Microsoft corporate email (Midnight Blizzard)Jan 19, 2024A password spray compromised a legacy non-production test tenant account whose permissions reached corporate emailstolen-user-credentials
Capital OneJul 2019The company calls the issue a configuration vulnerability reported by a researcher; the mechanism is not public in the sources readnot public

Microsoft's 2019 support database had misconfigured network rules

Microsoft's January 2020 post says an investigation concluded that a change to the network security group of an internal customer support analytics database on December 5, 2019 contained misconfigured security rules. It says the investigation found no malicious use, that most customers did not have personal information exposed, and that the issue did not represent an exposure of its commercial cloud services (Microsoft, read 16 Nov 2026 via the Internet Archive).

Microsoft wrote that it had solutions to help prevent this kind of mistake, but that they were not enabled for this database. It listed three actions: auditing network security rules for internal resources, expanding the mechanisms that detect rule misconfigurations, and adding alerting to service teams.

A detection flagged Microsoft's 2023 storage token as a false positive

Microsoft's September 2023 post says a Microsoft researcher inadvertently included a Shared Access Signature token in a blob store URL posted in a public GitHub repository while contributing to open-source AI models. Wiz reported it to Microsoft on June 22, 2023, and Microsoft revoked the token on June 24, 2023. The post says there was no security issue or vulnerability in Azure Storage or the SAS feature, and that no customer data was exposed.

Microsoft also wrote that its own historical rescan of public repositories had detected the specific URL, but the finding was incorrectly marked as a false positive. It said the root cause was fixed (Microsoft, read 16 Nov 2026).

Scope, not exposure, was the fault in three entries

In AWS's bulletin the fault was a token scoped wider than its job. Dropbox's June 2024 post says the actor compromised a service account that was part of Sign's back-end and used it to reach the customer database. Microsoft's January 2024 post says the Midnight Blizzard actor used a legacy non-production test tenant account's permissions to reach corporate email. In all three the source describes access that was larger than needed, which the ledger records under over-permissioned-identity or the credential path.

The OCC's 2020 consent order on Capital One lists network security controls, data loss prevention controls and alert dispositioning among its findings, as findings about the bank's cloud risk management rather than the cause of the 2019 incident.

Sources

  1. Microsoft MSRC, access misconfiguration for customer support database (Internet Archive copy), read 16 Nov 2026
  2. Microsoft MSRC, overly permissive SAS token, read 16 Nov 2026
  3. AWS security bulletin AWS-2025-015, read 16 Nov 2026
  4. Dropbox Sign, a recent security incident, read 16 Nov 2026
  5. Microsoft MSRC, Midnight Blizzard, read 16 Nov 2026
  6. Capital One, 2019 cyber incident FAQ, read 16 Nov 2026
  7. OCC consent order, AA-EC-20-49, read 16 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.