# Public storage, databases and services: 15 incidents in the ledger

Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

A public resource is a storage container, database or service that was left reachable to anyone who could find its address, with no sign-in required, because a setting, a policy or a firewall rule allowed anonymous access, whether by choice, by mistake or through a later change.

## How it works

Provider defaults are closed. Amazon's documentation says new buckets, access points and objects do not allow public access by default, and that users can change policies or permissions to allow it. Microsoft's documentation says anonymous access to blob data is prohibited by default and that a container set for anonymous access can be read by any client. Public access is therefore a setting someone changed, or a policy attached later.

Because the resource asks for no credentials, the only barrier is the address, and addresses are guessed or scanned. Both providers document an account-wide switch that overrides individual settings: Amazon's documentation describes a block that applies at the organization, account and bucket levels, and Microsoft describes disallowing anonymous access for a whole storage account. Google Cloud documents a public access prevention setting for the same purpose.

## The incidents

| Disclosed | Organization | Cloud | How access was gained |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2023-11-16 | [Global Tel*Link Corp.](/incidents/global-tel-link-ftc-2020/) | not public | The FTC press release says that, after the company and a third-party vendor copied the data into the cloud for testing, changes made by the vendor to the security settings left the data accessible via the internet without safeguards, until a security researcher alerted the company. |
| 2023-06-16 | [1Health.io Inc. (formerly Vitagene, Inc.)](/incidents/vitagene-1health-ftc-2019/) | AWS | The FTC press release says the company stored the data in publicly accessible buckets on AWS cloud storage, did not encrypt it, restrict access to it, log or monitor access to it, or inventory it, and that it was warned at least three times over a two-year period before investigating after a security researcher contacted it in June 2019. |
| 2023-03-10 | [Eatigo International Pte. Ltd.](/incidents/eatigo-pdpc-2020/) | not public | The decision says the legacy database sat on the infrastructure of a cloud service provider in Singapore, was left out of the company's private network setup, was reachable from the internet to anyone with the credentials, and had no password rotation rule. Staff no longer knew it existed, and no asset inventory or access logs were kept, so the company could not establish how or when access was gained. |
| 2022-10-19 | [Microsoft (misconfigured storage endpoint)](/incidents/microsoft-misconfigured-endpoint-2022/) | not public | The post-mortem says an unintentional misconfiguration on an endpoint, not a security vulnerability, allowed unauthenticated access; the endpoint is now accessible only with authentication. |
| 2022-07-14 | [Crawfort Pte. Ltd.](/incidents/crawfort-pdpc-2020/) | AWS | The decision says the company opened an S3 server port in its AWS environment for one week during a data migration, and that the S3 bucket holding the data was publicly accessible due to a misconfiguration. It states the threat actor gained access to the public bucket in that period. |
| 2022-06-30 | [Wegmans](/incidents/wegmans-azure-containers-2021/) | Microsoft Azure | A security researcher told the company in April 2021 that a cloud storage container hosted on Microsoft Azure was open to public access; the release says a second container had been public since November 2018. |
| 2022-06-30 | [Wegmans Food Markets, Inc.](/incidents/wegmans-azure-container-2018/) | Microsoft Azure | The New York Attorney General states that in April 2021 a security researcher informed the company that a cloud storage container hosted on Microsoft Azure was left unsecured and open to public access. The Attorney General’s office found the company failed to configure the container to limit access, to inventory its cloud assets, to secure all user passwords and to regularly conduct security testing of its cloud assets. |
| 2021-10-14 | [Stylez Pte Ltd](/incidents/stylez-icompare-pdpc-2019/) | not public | The decision says the testing database was hosted on a cloud server leased from a cloud storage service provider, stored in a publicly accessible directory without access controls, so it was reachable from the internet and was crawled and indexed by search engines. |
| 2020-12-16 | [SkyMed International, Inc.](/incidents/skymed-ftc-2020/) | not public | The FTC press release says the database was unsecured and exposed by a security researcher, and that it could be located and accessed by anyone on the Internet. The press release says the company deleted the database after confirming that the data was online and publicly accessible. |
| 2020-12-15 | [Ascension Data & Analytics](/incidents/ascension-data-2019/) | not public | The FTC complaint says a vendor hired for text recognition scanning stored the documents on a cloud-based server and a separate cloud-based storage location, misconfigured both, and left the information exposed to anyone on the internet; no password was required. The complaint says the respondent did not assess the vendor's security measures. |
| 2020-10-16 | [Chan Brothers Travel Pte Ltd](/incidents/chan-brothers-travel-pdpc-2019/) | Salesforce | The decision says the company hosted its site on Salesforce Community Cloud with the access configuration set to Public. A March 2018 release added an automated search engine optimisation feature, and the forms inherited the public setting, so the data was indexed. The company said it received no notice of the release; the decision found the release notes were published. |
| 2020-10-16 | [MRI Diagnostics Pte Ltd and Clarity Radiology Pte Ltd](/incidents/mri-diagnostics-clarity-radiology-pdpc-2018/) | not public | The decision says the clinic subscribed to an internet-based teleradiology system provided by Clarity Radiology, a cloud-based software service, which engaged an overseas vendor to maintain it. The vendor removed access restrictions on a network folder to patch the system and did not restore them, so the spreadsheets were indexed by search engines. |
| 2020-07-22 | [Twilio](/incidents/twilio-2020/) | AWS | The company's incident report says a misconfiguration in the S3 bucket hosting the library let a bad actor inject code, and that the access policy for the path storing the SDK allowed anybody on the Internet to read and write to that path. |
| 2020-01-22 | [Microsoft](/incidents/microsoft-support-database-2019/) | Microsoft Azure | The post says a change made to the database's network security group on December 5, 2019 contained misconfigured security rules that enabled exposure of the data. It says the investigation found no malicious use, and that the issue was specific to an internal database and does not represent an exposure of the company's commercial cloud services. |
| 2019-06-28 | [Online Buddies (Jack’d dating app)](/incidents/online-buddies-jackd-s3-2018/) | AWS | The New York Attorney General’s investigation confirmed the company failed to secure user photos stored in an AWS S3 storage service, and left app interfaces to backend data unsecured. |

## The kind of control that addresses it

enforce an account-wide or organization-wide block on public access to storage, and require sign-in for every database and service

## Related pages

- [Cross-tenant access: cloud breaches by access path](/access-paths/cross-tenant/)
- [Third-party access: cloud breaches by access path](/access-paths/third-party-access/)
- [Exposed network services and request paths: cloud breaches](/access-paths/exposed-network-service/)

## Sources

- Amazon S3 User Guide: blocking public access: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/access-control-block-public-access.html (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft Learn: remediate anonymous read access to blob data: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/anonymous-read-access-prevent (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Google Cloud: public access prevention: https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/public-access-prevention (read 16 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudsecuritybreaches.com/access-paths/public-resource/
